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THE NETWORK UTILITY 
KEVIN WERBACH† 
Barring unforeseen obstacles, an on-line interactive computer 
service, provided commercially by an information utility, may be as 
commonplace by 2000 A.D. as telephone service is today. 
  —Martin Greenberger1 
ABSTRACT 
  The rise of cloud computing, which involves remote network-
based applications and storage, is shifting the balance in the data 
world from distributed edge systems to centralized networked 
platforms. This emerging paradigm bears a striking resemblance to 
the computer utility, a widespread vision among technologists in the 
1960s. The way the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
grappled with the convergence of computing and communications in 
that period shaped the trajectory of both industries. Technology and 
market structure have changed dramatically, but the basic regulatory 
issues remain: networked computers need access to communications 
utilities, and networked computing platforms can themselves function 
as public utilities. The FCC must return to and update its original 
convergence agenda. As the technical predictions of 1960s visionaries 
become real, the policy considerations they raised must also be taken 
seriously. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Midway through the twentieth century, two great technologies, 
the telecommunications network and the computer, embarked on a 
collision course. Experts in the 1960s speculated about a “computer 
utility” that would profoundly influence both business and society. 
Not long after, the FCC began to grapple with this convergence of 
computing and communications. The FCC’s actions in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s shaped the future of both industries and ultimately 
set in motion the current debate about Internet regulation. Both the 
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regulator and the parties arguing before it understood in the 1960s 
that networked data processing raised two kinds of issues: computers 
as users of communications and computers as a form of 
communication. The FCC chose to quarantine data processing from 
regulated telecommunications, rather than tackle the public policy 
considerations of the nascent computer utility directly. The 
spectacular success of the information technology sector over the 
subsequent forty years shows the wisdom of that decision.2 
The twenty-first century is an era of networks. There are now 
two billion Internet users and five billion mobile phone subscribers—
a degree of connectivity unprecedented in human history.3 Facebook 
has over five hundred million members, many of whom spend hours 
every day on the social networking site.4 Google indexes one trillion 
documents and, a decade after its founding, provides a stunning array 
of services ranging from satellite and photographic images of much of 
the world to a video library that adds thirty-five hours of content 
every minute.5 Children grow up texting and playing networked 
games, and businesses depend on email, databases, and other digital 
 
 2. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: 
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 149–55 (2005) (“Until very 
recently, all telecommunications services were joined hip to hip with the particular facilities on 
which they were provided. . . . The Internet, however, upsets this established order.”); Barbara 
Esbin, Internet over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 
37, 57–58 (1999) (“The Commission initiated a series of proceedings in 1966, known as the 
‘Computer Inquiry’ proceedings, which, at the outset, attempted to separate the regulatory 
treatment of computers that were involved in the means of communication from the treatment 
of computers which perform data processing services.”); Jason Oxman, The FCC and the 
Unregulation of the Internet 4–6 (FCC Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper No. 31, 1999), 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf (“The Internet has 
created the information revolution, and it is on its way to becoming the single most important 
communications tool in existence.”). 
 3. See Lance Whitney, Cell Phone Subscriptions to Hit 5 Billion Globally, CNET  
(Feb. 16, 2010, 8:28 PM PST), http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-13970_7-10454065-78.html (citing 
International Telecommunications Union estimates that global mobile subscribers will exceed 
five billion sometime in 2010); The Internet Big Picture: World Internet Users and Population 
Stats, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Apr. 
12, 2011) (showing approximately two billion global Internet users). 
 4. See Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2011) (explaining that Facebook has more than five hundred million active users 
and noting that people spend over seven hundred billion minutes per month on the site). 
 5. See Jesse Alpert & Nissan Haja, We Knew the Web Was Big . . . , THE OFFICIAL 
GOOGLE BLOG (July 25, 2008, 10:12 AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/07/we-knew-
web-was-big.html (announcing one trillion links in the Google search index); Don Reisinger, 
YouTube: 35 Hours of Video Uploaded Every Minute, CNET (Nov. 11, 2010, 8:39 AM PST), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13506_3-20022481-17.html (noting that YouTube users upload 
approximately thirty-five hours of video to the site every minute). 
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tools. Burgeoning corporate data repositories and massive data 
centers parallel the vast stores of personal data collected by 
governments. And with the rise of wireless broadband connections, 
mobile devices, and sensors, no moment or place is untouched by the 
network’s tentacles.6 
The time has come to reexamine the FCC’s early decisions on 
the convergence of computing and communications. Digitization and 
consolidation have erased old boundaries. The FCC’s contentious 
decade-long effort to articulate regulatory dividing lines for 
broadband Internet access is moving toward closure.7 Meanwhile, the 
rise of remote network-based applications and storage, or “cloud 
computing,” is shifting the balance in the data world from distributed 
edge systems to centralized networked platforms.8 Something very 
much like the old computer utility vision is coming back into focus. 
Technology and industry structure have changed dramatically, but the 
basic regulatory issues remain: networked computers need access to 
communications utilities, and networked computers can themselves 
function as utilities. Through many twists and turns, the FCC’s early 
decision to tackle only the first of these concerns has morphed into a 
posture of skepticism toward both.9 The FCC must return to and 
update its original convergence agenda. As the technical predictions 
of 1960s visionaries become real, the policy considerations they raised 
must also be taken seriously. 
How government and society choose to deal with pervasive 
networks will go a long way toward shaping the political economy of 
the coming decades. Previously, the relevant public policy debate was 
largely focused on network neutrality rules for broadband Internet 
access providers.10 “Network neutrality” is the notion that network 
 
 6. See Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2321, 2321 (2007) 
(“The world is different today. Technology has dramatically broadened the scope and accuracy 
of information about individuals and their actions.”). 
 7. See Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and “Telecommunications Services,” Universal 
Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 YALE. J. 
ON REG. 211, 212 (1999) (discussing the difficulty of classifying the Internet within the 
traditional communications infrastructure). 
 8. See infra Part III.A. 
 9. See generally Oxman, supra note 2 (describing the evolution of the FCC’s policy of 
“unregulation” toward Internet services and network platforms). 
 10. See Rob Frieden, A Primer on Network Neutrality, 43 INTERECONOMICS 4, 14–15 
(2008) (“[N]etwork neutrality advocates have identified actual instances where ISPs unilaterally 
have blocked traffic, to reduce subscribers’ network demand, handicap a competitor, punish 
ventures for not agreeing to pay a surcharge and to stifle criticism about the ISP and its parent 
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operators should not be permitted to discriminate unreasonably in 
their treatment of unaffiliated content, devices, and services.11 Since 
the FCC began in 2002 to classify broadband access as an 
“information service” outside of traditional telecommunications 
regulation, open Internet advocates have pushed for the imposition of 
such nondiscrimination requirements.12 The network neutrality battle 
 
corporation.”); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 141, 142–44 (2003) (introducing the argument that the “preferable framework 
for ensuring network neutrality” eschews “structural remedies for a direct scrutiny of 
broadband discrimination”). See generally ANGELE A. GILROY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40616, ACCESS TO BROADBAND NETWORKS: THE NET NEUTRALITY DEBATE (2010) 
(describing the extensive debate over the network neutrality issue). 
 11. Then-SBC Chief Executive Officer Edward Whitacre captured the essence of the 
network neutrality concern when, asked about the future of Internet startups like Google, MSN, 
and Vonage, he remarked:  
How do you think they’re going to get to customers? Through a broadband pipe. 
Cable companies have them. We have them. Now what they would like to do is use 
my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them do that because we have spent this capital 
and we have to have a return on it. 
At SBC, It’s All About “Scale and Scope,” BUS. WK., Nov. 7, 2005, http://www.businessweek
.com/magazine/content/05_45/b3958092.htm. For arguments supporting network neutrality, see 
generally Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics 
of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383 (2007); Wu, 
supra note 10; and Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality: What a Non-Discrimination Rule 
Should Look Like (Stanford Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, Working Paper No. 1684677, 
2010). For arguments opposing network neutrality, see generally Gerald Faulhaber, Network 
Neutrality: The Debate Evolves, 1 INT’L J. OF COMM. 680 (2007); Christopher S. Yoo, Network 
Neutrality and Competition Policy: A Complex Relationship, in NET NEUTRALITY OR NET 
NEUTERING: SHOULD BROADBAND INTERNET SERVICES BE REGULATED 25 (Thomas M. 
Lenard & Randolph J. May eds., 2006); and Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, 
Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179 (2008). The FCC has chosen to use the 
term “open Internet” when referring to this concept. See, e.g., Preserving the Open Internet, 74 
Fed. Reg. 62,638, 62,638 (proposed Nov. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8) (“In this 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the Commission considers adopting rules to preserve 
the open Internet.” (emphasis added)). 
 12. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other 
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed 
rulemaking) (“[W]e conclude that cable modem service, as it is currently offered, is properly 
classified as an interstate information service, not as a cable service, and that there is no 
separate offering of telecommunications service.”); Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the 
Project of Communications Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 359, 401–02 (2007) (“These network 
providers claim that they will have no incentive to improve the penetration of broadband 
services in the United States if they are not given the power to control their networks and sell 
separately prioritized, guaranteed services. But because the transport layer for Internet access is 
not competitive, deregulation of that layer is inappropriate.” (footnote omitted)); Mark A. 
Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet 
in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 927 (2001) (“How these technologies [DSL and 
cable modems] are developed, and the speed with which they are deployed, are critical to the 
future design of the internet.”); Wu, supra note 10, at 142 (“The basic principle behind a 
network antidiscrimination regime is to give users the right to use non-harmful network 
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ratcheted up to a fever pitch in late 2009. It did not cool down even 
after the FCC adopted an order on December 21, 2010, setting forth 
network neutrality rules.13 
The debate demonstrates that both regulators and deregulators 
suffer from a tendency to fight the last war. Network neutrality, 
though important, is the final hurrah of the regulatory framework 
created in the 1996 Telecommunications Act (1996 Act),14 which was 
itself a response to the 1984 divestiture of AT&T. All of these efforts 
involve the shift from regulated monopoly to managed competition 
within defined industry segments.15 Meanwhile, outside the regulatory 
theater, the marketplace has evolved. The telecommunications and 
mass media industries the FCC historically regulated are giving way 
to digital information platforms in a common environment—the 
Internet. The Internet, which began as a messaging and remote access 
service, is becoming the repository of massive pools of data 
processing and storage, a trend known as cloud computing.16 At the 
same time, it is becoming less a means of connecting personal 
computers and more a common platform for vast numbers of 
 
attachments or applications, and give innovators the corresponding freedom to supply them. 
Such a regime avoids some of the costs of structural regulation . . . .”); Letter from Tim Wu, 
Associate Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, and Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford 
Law Sch., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC 12–15 (Aug. 22, 2003), available at http://fjallfoss.
fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=6514683884 (“The [proposed network neutrality] regime adopts 
the basic principle that broadband operators should have full freedom to ‘police what they own’ 
(the local network) while other restrictions should be viewed with suspicion.”). For a discussion 
of the “information service” classification, see infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1, 3 
(Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order) (“Today the Commission takes an important step to preserve 
the Internet as an open platform for innovation, investment, job creation, economic growth, 
competition, and free expression.”); Press Release, FCC, FCC Acts to Preserve Internet 
Freedom and Openness (Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_
Business/2010/db1221/DOC-303745A1.pdf (summarizing the FCC’s actions). 
 14. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The 1996 Act modified, rather than replaced, the 
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). This Article uses “1996 Act” to refer to the newly added 
sections and “Communications Act” to describe earlier provisions or the amended statute as a 
whole. 
 15. More specifically, network neutrality is an effort to prohibit unreasonable 
discrimination by incumbent network operators against competitive application and content 
providers. This approach implies that the application and content markets are the object of the 
FCC’s actions, while the network-access markets are its subject, much as the breakup of AT&T 
applied regulation to the dominant phone company to facilitate a competitive long-distance 
market. 
 16. See infra Part III.A. 
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personal devices and impersonal sensors, as well as a channel for 
large volumes of content, especially video. The FCC faces an 
enormous challenge in adapting to such an environment. 
Fortunately, the FCC can draw upon a substantial, yet largely 
forgotten, body of legal, business, and technical literature from the 
1960s concerning what was then called the “computer utility.”17 Even 
before ARPANet, the project that evolved into the Internet, 
technical experts and policymakers widely recognized that computers 
and communications would converge into a platform that raised 
significant public policy questions.18 The participants in the computer 
utility debates were wrong—or perhaps just forty years early—in 
their business forecasts. They were right in identifying the regulatory 
questions that the FCC, or a successor agency, should address in a 
converged digital world. Networked computer systems can function 
as utilities, even as they rely on other utilities to reach their 
customers. To achieve its public interest mandates, the FCC must 
consider the impact of cloud computing and related developments. It 
should examine four primary categories of issues for these new 
network platforms: connectivity, meaning interconnection policies 
and access to communications capacity; robustness, meaning capacity, 
security, and reliability; data integrity, namely privacy and control 
over user data; and transparency, specifically the disclosure of 
network management practices and technical standards. All of these 
issues were first raised in the era of the computer utility. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the failings of 
the current debates over network neutrality and the FCC’s legal 
authority to regulate broadband. Part II traces the history of public 
utility regulation and the computer utility debates of the 1960s. Part 
III describes the rise of cloud computing and sets out an agenda for 
regulation in an era of network utilities. 
I.  A FUNDAMENTAL DISCONNECT 
Although the FCC’s engagement with the Internet has arguably 
been a great policy success, the history of that engagement has not 
been smooth.19 One problem is that the FCC has labored for fifteen 
 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
 18. See infra Part II.C. 
 19. See Kevin Werbach, The Federal Computer Commission, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) 
(arguing that the FCC’s engagement with the computer and Internet industries has produced 
substantial benefits); John Eggerton, Hundt: Internet Is the New Broadcasting and Cable, 
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years under a statute that preserves old analog silos, such as 
telephone service and broadcasting, in a converged digital world.20 
Simply breaking down those boundaries, however, is no longer 
enough. As Internet-based digital connectivity becomes the 
foundation for all communications, media, and computer-based 
services, the core issues the FCC was created to promote—
competition, innovation, investment, consumer protection, and civic 
discourse21—remain as important as ever. What has changed is the 
industry landscape and the associated technological and economic 
environment in which those issues develop. The FCC faces many 
important issues today, including freeing up more wireless capacity, 
promoting the open Internet, and implementing the National 
Broadband Plan.22 An inquiry into the role of the FCC tomorrow, 
however, must take notice of broader concerns. 
The problems with the current regulatory structure can be 
examined at three levels. First, the existing legal framework provides 
insufficiently robust statutory scaffolding for the tasks the FCC faces. 
Second, even if the statutory imprecision could be rectified, the FCC 
lacks the capacity for effective regulatory boundary-drawing in the 
postmonopoly communications environment. Third, the FCC is set up 
to consider the Internet as a specific case or adjunct to its core 
 
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 12, 2010, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/450170-
Hundt_Internet_Is_the_New_Broadcasting_and_Cable.php (quoting former FCC Chairman 
Reed Hundt’s claims that FCC actions cleared the way for the broadband Internet as the 
nation’s common medium); Oxman, supra note 2, at 7–15 (describing the FCC’s early Internet 
policy decisions). 
 20. See Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 37, 39–54 (2002) (“The Internet creates particular tensions with the outdated but 
deeply rooted structure of the current regulatory framework.”). 
 21. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (“[T]here is created a commission to be known as the 
‘Federal Communications Commission’, which shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, and 
which shall execute and enforce the provisions of this chapter.”); see also Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
47 U.S.C.) (“An Act [t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower 
prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage 
the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.”). 
 22. See FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, at ix (2009), 
available at http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf (“This is 
America’s plan, written by and for Americans. It’s now time to act and invest in our nation’s 
future by bringing the power and promise of broadband to us all.”). Congress directed the FCC 
to develop a National Broadband Plan in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 6001(k)(1), 123 Stat. 115, 515 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 305(k)(1)). 
The FCC issued the plan in March 2010 and is now conducting proceedings to implement its 
recommendations. FCC, supra, at ix. 
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regulatory activities, even though it has become the basic platform for 
all of the industries within the FCC’s sphere of action. 
A. The Internet Meets Telecom Regulation 
1. The Internet Challenge.  The Internet is not a particular set of 
services or technologies. It is not the same thing as broadband, and it 
is not the same thing as the Web.23 The Internet is fundamentally an 
agreement to interconnect using an evolving set of technical 
protocols, which enable universal delivery of data across the 
network.24 What makes the concept of the Internet challenging for 
businesspeople and policymakers alike is that it is, in a sense, an 
illusion. The Internet is a set of voluntary agreements to follow an 
evolving set of consensual practices and protocols.25 
The Internet has changed and developed rapidly over time, and 
it will continue to do so. Although critical attributes of the Internet 
were evident in 1995—and in some cases in 1985 or 1975—much 
changed in the subsequent fifteen years. The Internet in the 1990s was 
truly a nascent business and social phenomenon. Most Americans 
were not online, and even smaller percentages of citizens in most 
other countries used the Internet.26 Electronic commerce and online 
advertising were insignificant in comparison to their nondigital 
 
 23. The World Wide Web is a particular application and set of protocols for delivering 
information from Internet-connected servers to end-user browsers. The Internet encompasses 
many such applications, including email, file sharing, and voice communications tools such as 
Skype. The Internet is the underlying platform for such applications. 
 24. In the words of the Federal Networking Council in 1995: 
“Internet” refers to the global information system that—(i) is logically linked 
together by a globally unique address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its 
subsequent extensions/follow-ons; (ii) is able to support communications using the 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent 
extensions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and (iii) provides, uses 
or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level services layered on the 
communications and related infrastructure described herein. 
Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel 
C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts & Stephen Wolff, A Brief History of the Internet, 
INTERNET SOC’Y, http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting the Federal Networking Council). 
 25. See Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, 
and the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 347–51 (2008) (“Like the railroad 
system or the electric power grid, the Internet is a collection of independent networks that 
coordinate their actions, forming what appears to be a seamless collective.”). 
 26. In 1995, there were twenty-five million Internet users in the United States and forty 
million worldwide. See Internet Users, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
IT.NET.USER (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) (presenting worldwide statistics for Internet use). 
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forebears. The primary providers of Internet access were independent 
Internet service providers (ISPs), not regulated telecommunications 
and cable companies. Laws and regulatory structures developed in 
that era are no longer appropriate in this one. 
When Congress passed the 1996 Act, there were approximately 
one hundred thousand websites in existence; there were well over one 
hundred million in 2011.27 In 1998, when Congress passed the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act28 and the Internet Tax Freedom Act,29 
Google had not yet been founded. In fact, virtually none of the top 
one hundred sites on the Web in 2010 existed at that time.30 Over 240 
million Americans—nearly 80 percent of the population—were 
Internet users in 2011, according to the World Bank.31 Millions more 
have access to the Internet at work. And with over 285 million U.S. 
mobile phone subscribers32 and widespread deployment of Wi-Fi 
wireless hotspots, a majority of American adults access the Internet 
through wireless connections, according to the Pew Research 
Center.33 
Even more significant than how the Internet has grown is how 
Internet usage has changed. In 1995, accessing the Internet meant 
initiating a dial-up connection through a modem attached to a 
personal computer, at speeds that required several seconds to 
 
 27. See Web Growth Summary, MIT, http://www.mit.edu/people/mkgray/net/web-growth-
summary.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). For an Internet-growth report contemporaneous to 
its birth, see Donna L. Hoffman, Patrali Chatterjee & Thomas P. Novak, Commercial Scenarios 
for the Web: Opportunities and Challenges, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM., Dec. 1995, http://
jcmc.indiana.edu/vol1/issue3/hoffman.html. For a prediction that Moore’s law applies to web 
growth, see K.G. Coffman & A.M. Odlyzko, Internet Growth: Is There a “Moore’s Law” for 
Data Traffic?, in AT&T HANDBOOK OF MASSIVE DATA SETS 47, 47–48 (James Abello, Panos 
M. Pardalos & Mauricio G.C. Resende eds., 2002). 
 28. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
 29. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. C, tit. XI, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-719 
(1998) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (2006)). 
 30. See The 1000 Most-Visited Sites on the Web, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
adplanner/static/top1000 (last updated Feb. 2011) (listing the one thousand most-visited sites on 
the Web). 
 31. See Internet Users, supra note 26 (detailing the number of Internet users since 1980). 
 32. Press Release, CTIA, CTIA—The Wireless Association Announces Semi-Annual 
Wireless Industry Survey Results (Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://www.ctia.org/media/press/
body.cfm/prid/1936. 
 33. See PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, MOBILE ACCESS 2010, at 7 (2010), available 
at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Mobile_Access_2010.pdf. 
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download a single image file.34 By 2010, the vast majority of 
Americans had broadband access, an always-on service roughly one 
hundred times as fast.35 Software and hardware have evolved to offer 
a smoother, richer, more sophisticated Internet experience. Personal 
computers and even packaged software applications now offer built-
in automatic updating and other communications functions, taking for 
granted an Internet connection as an integral part of the computing 
experience. 
2. The Regulatory Muddle.  The telecommunications industry is 
subject to extensive regulation by the FCC, an independent federal 
administrative agency created in 1934.36 Under the Communications 
Act of 1934 (Communications Act),37 the FCC oversees the terms 
under which communications companies provide service to their 
customers and interconnect with partners or competitors; grants 
licenses to use the airwaves for radio, television, mobile phone, 
satellite, and other wireless communications; engages in consumer-
protection activities involving communications providers; regulates 
indecency in broadcast media; authorizes wireless devices; reviews 
communications mergers; promotes communications access for 
people with disabilities; and oversees competition in the 
telecommunications and media sector, among other activities.38 Much 
of the Communications Act is sector-specific, including Title II for 
telephone service, Title III for broadcasting, and Title VI for cable 
television.39 Depending on the classification of a company or service, 
 
 34. See RAY HORAK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK 
635–36 (2007) (discussing dial-up access). 
 35. A February 2010 FCC survey found that 78 percent of American adults are Internet 
users and 65 percent have home broadband access. John B. Horrigan, Broadband Adoption and 
Use in America 3 (FCC Omnibus Broadband Initiative, Working Paper No. 1, 2010), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296442A1.pdf. 
 36. See generally PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW (2d ed. 1999) (describing the detailed system of federal 
telecommunications regulation in the United States). State public utility commissions also 
regulate intrastate communications, and some activities—such as cable television franchising 
and access to poles and conduits—are regulated at the municipal level. NUECHTERLEIN & 
WEISER, supra note 2, at 47–48, 162. 
 37. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 38. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 36, at 209–12, 220–32, 279–313 (providing an overview of 
the authority and jurisdiction of the FCC). 
 39. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–276 (2006) (Title II); id. §§ 301–399 (Title III); id. §§ 521–573 
(Title VI). 
WERBACH IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 4/14/2011  6:24:49 PM 
1772 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1761 
different obligations may apply. In 1996, Congress passed a major 
overhaul that modified the statute to incorporate other distinctions, 
such as imposing unbundling and wholesale obligations on incumbent 
local-exchange carriers, but not on other providers of 
telecommunications service.40 
The 1996 Act was primarily concerned with enabling and 
encouraging three distinct segments of the communications 
marketplace to cross over into each other’s domains: local exchange 
carriers, interexchange carriers, and cable television operators.41 
Congress’s vision was that the entry of new competitors into the local 
telephony, long-distance, and multichannel video markets would 
promote innovation and lower prices while simultaneously 
eliminating regulatory restraints.42 Many competitors entered the 
market, only to fail due to changing market conditions, the resistance 
of the incumbents, and basic flaws in the 1996 Act’s scheme for 
network unbundling.43 
 
 40. See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 101, § 251, 110 
Stat. 56, 61–66 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006)). 
 41. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 2, at 69–74 (discussing the objectives of the 
1996 Act); CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING, PHYLLIS W. BERNT & MARTIN B.H. WEISS, SHAPING 
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS 
258–66 (2006) (describing the culmination of pro-competitive forces in the 1996 Act); Nicholas 
Economides, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Its Impact, 11 JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 
455, 456–57 (1999) (discussing the goals of the 1996 Act); Charles B. Goldfarb, 
Telecommunications Act: Competition, Innovation, and Reform, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
ACT: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND REFORM 1, 8–10 (Charles B. Goldfarb ed., 2006) 
(discussing the background of the 1996 Act). 
Local exchange carriers provide end users with connections to the public switched 
telephone network. Historically, these providers were granted exclusive monopolies for their 
territories. Such incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) generally retain significant market 
power, even though today competitors may enter their markets, either by leasing portions of the 
incumbent network, or by using their own facilities, as in the case of cable telephony or mobile 
phone service. Interexchange carriers (IXCs) provide long-distance service between local 
exchange carriers. When AT&T was broken up in 1984, it was split into a competitive IXC and 
seven regulated ILECs. These “Baby Bells” have since merged down to three (Verizon, AT&T, 
and Qwest) and remain the dominant local exchange providers in most of the United States. 
After the 1996 Act, they also reintegrated local and interexchange services, a practice that was 
prohibited under the AT&T divestiture consent decree. SBC Communications, one of the Baby 
Bells, acquired and took on the name of AT&T, and Verizon acquired MCI. Both providers 
also offer mobile phone service, an area in which they compete against pure-play mobile 
operators such as Sprint and T-Mobile. See generally NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 2, 
at 55–91 (describing the regulation of wireline carriers before and after the 1996 Act). 
 42. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 2, at 69–70 (“The Act’s foremost aspiration 
is greater competition in local telecommunications markets.”). 
 43. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and Associations: Why the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 Misfired, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 315, 315–16 (2005) (“There is 
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Over time, though, some intermodal competition has developed. 
Cable operators such as Comcast and Time Warner Cable now offer 
phone service to millions of customers, in competition with the 
reconsolidated children of the old AT&T.44 Verizon and AT&T offer 
multichannel video packages in competition with cable, as do direct 
broadcast satellite providers.45 And a quarter of U.S. households have 
chosen to use a mobile phone as their primary or sole telephone 
service.46 The biggest development since 1996, however, has been 
convergence. All of these providers now use digital transmission, and 
most employ Internet protocol standards to deliver their various 
services.47 In other words, the Internet has become the common 
platform for all communications industries. 
The Internet was an afterthought in the 1996 Act.48 The only time 
it is even mentioned expressly is in connection with the 
Communications Decency Act of 199649 provisions—since 
overturned—that imposed restrictions on indecent online speech and 
created a safe harbor for online service providers.50 The 1996 Act left 
in place the regulatory silos of telephony (Title II), broadcasting 
(Title III), and cable television (Title VI), even though converged 
 
widespread agreement today on all sides of the telecommunications wars that something is 
deeply flawed with the design or implementation (or both) of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.”); Thomas W. Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommunications Networks with and Without 
Mandatory Sharing, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 477, 478 (2005) (criticizing the mandatory unbundling 
provisions in the 1996 Act and commenting on the demise of competitive entrants based on 
unbundling); Susan Ness, The Law of Unintended Consequences, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 531, 532 
(2006) (explaining the shortcomings of the 1996 Act); Howard A. Shelanski, Inter-Modal 
Competition and Telecommunications Policy in the United States, 60 COMM. & STRATEGIES 15, 
15 (2005) (describing how industry changes following the adoption of the 1996 Act have made it 
obsolete). 
 44. The National Cable and Telecommunications Association (NCTA) reports 23.5 million 
cable telephony customers as of September 2010. Operating Metrics, NCTA, http://www.ncta
.com/StatsGroup/OperatingMetric.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). 
 45. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of 
Video Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 542, 545 (2009). 
 46. Maggie Fox, Nearly a Quarter of U.S. Homes Only Use Cellphones, REUTERS, May 12, 
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64B6F620100512. 
 47. Michael K. Powell, Comm’r, FCC, The Great Digital Broadband Migration, Remarks 
Before the Progress & Freedom Foundation (Dec. 8, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Speeches/Powell/2000/spmkp003.html. 
 48. See Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 541 (2010) (“The Internet 
is a perfect example [of] when new technologies develop that Congress did not contemplate.”). 
 49. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43, 
invalidated in part by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 50. See Werbach, supra note 48, at 555–61 (discussing the legislative history of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996). 
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digital services could have elements of all three. The 1996 Act did 
establish a statutory category for information services, defined as “the 
offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, 
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available 
information via telecommunications . . . .”51 This definition is broad 
enough to encompass Internet-based services. But the 1996 Act was 
silent as to what, if any, obligations or FCC actions might attach to 
that classification. The fight over FCC jurisdiction to adopt open 
Internet rules for broadband access stems from this omission.52 
Approaches based on the information-services classification are 
referred to as “Title I” options because that definition and the 
general regulatory delegations to the FCC sit within that introductory 
title of the Communications Act, as opposed to the service-specific 
mandates of later titles.53 
The category of information services paralleled the FCC’s 
preexisting category of enhanced services, and the Commission later 
concluded that the two terms covered the same activities.54 There is, 
however, an important difference between enhanced and information 
services. The enhanced services category was originally created in the 
FCC’s Computer II55 decisions to cover companies that were separate 
from the network operators who provided the underlying basic 
services of telecommunications transport.56 An enhanced service 
provider (ESP), for example, was considered an end user of the 
 
 51. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 3(a)(2), § 153(41), 110 Stat. 
56, 59 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006)). 
 52. See generally Werbach, supra note 48, at 541–45 (discussing the application of the 1996 
Act to the Internet). 
 53. In Off the Hook, supra note 48, I proposed an ancillary jurisdiction theory rooted in the 
interconnection provisions of Title II of the Act, combining the two approaches. Id. at 571–98. 
 54. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,871 (2005) (report and order and notice of proposed 
rulemaking) (“[T]he Commission has previously determined that Congress intended the 
statutory categories [of information service and telecommunications service] to parallel the 
categories [of enhanced service and basic service that] the Commission established in the 
Computer Inquiry proceeding.”). 
 55. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second 
Computer Inquiry) (Computer II), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (final decision). 
 56. See id. at 417 (establishing a “separation of common carrier transmission services from 
those computer services which depend on common carrier services in the transmission of 
information”); Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s 
Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 185–88 (2003) (discussing the definition of 
enhanced services). The basic-enhanced distinction in Computer II revised the division between 
communications and data processing in earlier FCC decisions. See infra note 201 and 
accompanying text. 
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network with access to local business line rates, rather than a carrier 
subject to usage-based interstate access charges.57 A network 
operator, such as a Bell Operating Company, could provide enhanced 
services, subject to competitive safeguards, but in that situation, it 
would still be a basic service provider offering enhanced services. The 
1996 Act subtly shifted the category by defining information services 
as those involving computer processing “via telecommunications.”58 
This opened the door for the move the FCC eventually made in 2002: 
classifying broadband access providers that provided both 
telecommunications and information service functionality as 
integrated information service providers.59 The exception for nascent 
users of the network had become the classification for the network 
operators themselves. 
In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Services,60 the Supreme Court affirmed the FCC’s 
classification of broadband Internet access as a Title I information 
service.61 The Court expressed skepticism that the FCC’s choice was 
the proper one, and three Justices dissented on the basis that the 
statute compels classification of broadband transmission as a Title II 
telecommunications service.62 But the Court upheld the FCC’s actions 
on administrative law grounds, invoking Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
National Resources Defense Council, Inc.63 to give deference to an 
expert agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous 
congressional delegation.64 Because it was asked only to decide the 
 
 57. See MTS and WATS Market Structure, 97 F.C.C.2d 682, 711–22 (1983) (memorandum 
opinion and order) (clarifying the application of the FCC’s rules to entities such as enhanced 
service providers). 
 58. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 3(a)(2), § 153(41), 110 Stat. 
56, 59 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(24) (2006)). 
 59. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other 
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed 
rulemaking) (“[W]e conclude that cable modem service, as it is currently offered, is properly 
classified as an interstate information service, not as a cable service, and that there is no 
separate offering of telecommunications service.”); Appropriate Framework for Broadband 
Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. at 14,858 (“Consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in NCTA v. Brand X[, 545 U.S. 967 (2005)], we determine that 
facilities-based wireline broadband Internet access service is an information service.”). 
 60. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 61. Id. at 1003. 
 62. Id. at 1005 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 63. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 64. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980–86 (applying the Chevron framework to the FCC’s 
interpretation of the term “telecommunications service”). 
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FCC’s authority to impose the information-services classification, the 
Court did not have to consider what, if any, rules the FCC might then 
impose on broadband providers. 
The FCC in Brand X repeatedly asserted, and the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed in dicta, that Title I was more than a regulatory get-
out-of-jail free card.65 In 2005, the FCC adopted four Internet policy 
principles that described user rights vis-à-vis broadband access 
providers.66 It coupled these nonbinding principles with the stern 
pronouncement that it would incorporate them into its ongoing 
regulatory activity as appropriate.67 But the FCC did not explain how 
it would do so. Despite loud public and congressional debate about 
network neutrality, three more years passed before the FCC actually 
tried to impose obligations on a broadband provider for violation of 
those principles. When the FCC sanctioned Comcast in 2008 for its 
broadband network management practices, Comcast successfully 
sued it for acting without statutory authority.68 
3. The Open Internet Proceeding and Beyond.  The election of 
President Obama triggered a renewed emphasis on network 
neutrality. Obama endorsed the concept during his campaign,69 and 
 
 65. See id. at 996 (“[T]he Commission remains free to impose special regulatory duties on 
facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction.”); Appropriate Framework for 
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,981 (2005) 
(report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking) (Copps, Comm’r, concurring) (“I also 
want to note that the Supreme Court’s Brand X decision makes it clear that the Commission’s 
ancillary authority can accommodate our work on homeland security, universal service, 
disabilities access, competition, and Internet discrimination protections—and more.”). 
 66. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986, 14,987–88 (2005) (policy statement) (listing four principles “to 
ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, open, affordable, and accessible to all 
consumers”). 
 67. Id. at 14,988. 
 68. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that the FCC 
had failed to make a showing that it had ancillary authority “to regulate an Internet service 
provider’s network management practices”). 
 69. Barack Obama: Connecting and Empowering All Americans Through Technology and 
Innovation, BARACKOBAMA.COM, http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/technology/Fact_
Sheet_Innovation_and_Technology.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) (supporting “the principle of 
network neutrality to preserve the benefits of open competition on the internet” and noting that 
“[u]sers must be free to access content, to use applications, and to attach personal devices”). 
Upon the enactment of the Open Internet Order, Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 
17,905, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1 (Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order), President Obama 
expressed his satisfaction with the measure. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press 
Sec’y, Statement by the President on Today’s FCC Vote on Net Neutrality (Dec. 21, 2010), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/21/statement-president-today-s-
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his choice for FCC chairman, Julius Genachowski, expressed similar 
support.70 The FCC began an open Internet proceeding in October 
2009, proposing enforceable rules for the first time.71 It bogged down 
after the Comcast decision threw the FCC’s legal authority into 
question, and broadband providers launched a fierce lobbying 
assault.72 
On December 21, 2010, the FCC adopted an order formalizing its 
open Internet rules (Open Internet Order).73 The FCC articulated a 
new theory of its jurisdiction to regulate broadband Internet access, 
based on Section 706 of the 1996 Act, which directed the agency to 
promote the deployment of “advanced telecommunications 
capability.”74 The Order barred wireline broadband access providers 
from blocking or unreasonably discriminating against unaffiliated 
services, and it initially imposed lesser restrictions on wireless 
broadband.75 The FCC suggested that “paid prioritization”—offering 
service providers enhanced delivery for a fee—would likely fail the 
unreasonable discrimination test, but it left that question, and most 
other hard decisions, to case-by-case adjudication.76 Finally, the Open 
 
fcc-vote-net-neutrality (congratulating the FCC and its chairman for helping “preserve the 
freedom and openness” of the Internet). 
 70. See Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Preserving a Free and Open Internet: A 
Platform for Innovation, Opportunity, and Prosperity, Address at the Brookings Institution 
(Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-293568A1
.pdf (asserting that “Congress and the President have charged the FCC with developing a 
National Broadband Plan to ensure that every American has access to open and robust 
broadband” (emphasis added)). 
 71. See Preserving the Open Internet, 24 FCC Rcd. 13,064, 13,065 (2009) (notice of 
proposed rulemaking) (offering notice for “public input on draft rules to preserve an open 
Internet”). 
 72. See Editorial, The Price of Broadband Politics, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010, at A30 
(detailing the amount of money that phone and cable companies were spending on political 
contributions in opposition to the FCC’s plan to extend its regulatory oversight over access to 
broadband Internet); Bennett Roth, FCC Push on Net Neutrality Ramps Up Lobbying, ROLL 
CALL (Dec. 1, 2010, 9:40 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/-201079-1.html (describing “an 
already intense lobbying campaign by telecommunication giants, high-tech firms and open 
Internet advocates” that “is sure to become ever more feverish”). 
 73. Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1 (Dec. 
21, 2010) (report and order). 
 74. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 706, 47 U.S.C. § 1302; Preserving the Open Internet, 
52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) at 36–39 (ruling that Section 706 provides authority for open 
Internet rules). 
 75. Preserving the Open Internet, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) at 22–27, 29–31. 
 76. See id. at 22–30 (“[W]e will further develop the scope of reasonable network 
management on a case-by-case basis, as complaints about broadband providers’ actual practices 
arise.”). 
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Internet Order adopted a transparency mandate for broadband access 
providers, requiring them to disclose their network management 
practices to customers.77 The Order was a carefully crafted 
compromise. It pleased no one, and it seems likely to face legal 
challenges, as well as skeptical questioning from Congress.78 
In a previous article, I argued that the FCC could address the 
immediate challenge of supporting open Internet rules through an 
ancillary jurisdiction theory based on the interconnection provisions 
of the 1996 Act, as opposed to those it chose to support its 
jurisdiction.79 Even if the FCC had pursued this option, however, it 
would have solved only part of the challenge. The problem the FCC 
faces is that its authority comes from a statute that delegates and 
specifies regulatory requirements for telephony, cable, wireless 
telephony, satellite, and broadcast services. The marketplace it 
surveys today is rapidly moving away from those categories toward an 
environment featuring only digital broadband connectivity and 
services. Since 2002, the FCC has consistently concluded that the 1996 
Act places those offerings in the nether realm of information 
services.80 In other words, what the statute regulates no longer exists, 
and what does exist is barely addressed in the statute. 
The near-term drama about the FCC’s classification decision will 
play out, but any choice the FCC makes will only be a temporary 
solution. Congress must revamp the Communications Act for the 
digital broadband era. Such a major legislative change is not to be 
undertaken lightly. The 1996 Act was the result of many years of 
active deliberation and what was considered the mother of all 
 
 77. See id. at 19–22 (“Effective disclosure of broadband providers’ network management 
practices and the performance and commercial terms of their services promotes competition—
as well as innovation, investment, end-user choice, and broadband adoption . . . .”). 
 78. See, e.g., Brian Stelter, F.C.C. Faces Challenges to Net Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9801E6D91739F931A15751C1A9669D8B63 
(“Verizon said the F.C.C. order ‘appears to assert broad authority for sweeping new regulation 
of broadband wireline and wireless networks and the Internet itself’ without ‘solid statutory 
underpinnings.’”); Nate Anderson, Why Everyone Hates New Net Neutrality Rules—Even NN 
Supporters, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 21, 2010, 1:35 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/
2010/12/why-everyone-hates-new-net-neutrality-ruleseven-nn-supporters.ars (noting that “those 
who have always opposed net neutrality weren’t pleased with today’s FCC order instituting it”); 
Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Most of the Internet Grumbles About FCC Net Neutrality Rules, 
WALL ST. J. DIGITS BLOG, (Dec. 22, 2010, 4:30 PM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/12/22/
most-of-the-internet-grumbles-about-fcc-net-neutrality-rules. 
 79. See Werbach, supra note 48, at 571–97. 
 80. Id. at 576–82. 
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lobbying battles.81 The ultimate result bore little resemblance to 
earlier drafts after all of the horse-trading and reconciliation had 
concluded.82 The FCC and Congress are rightly focused on how to 
make the best of the current statutory framework, or perhaps on how 
to work a modest tweak to remove uncertainty about the 
Commission’s legal authority. Eventually, though, such 
incrementalism will not suffice. The old statute must give way.  
Merely saying so, however, is not enough. The solution to an 
outdated legal regime is not the elimination of a legal regime; nor is it 
recourse to the goodwill of industry self-regulatory bodies, valuable 
as those may be. The task now is to model paradigms and concepts 
for what must replace the current framework. 
B. Comcast–Level 3: Harbinger of Disputes to Come 
For all of the controversy about network neutrality, the scenarios 
under consideration in the FCC’s open Internet proceeding may turn 
out to be sideshows to the real battle. Network neutrality addresses 
the practices of broadband access providers toward their end-user 
customers.83 The Open Internet Order expressly limits its mandates to 
such activities.84 The access side of the network, however, is only part 
of the equation. Broadband access providers also connect to other 
networks.85 The complex mesh of network-to-network 
interconnection is the defining characteristic of the Internet.86 Users’ 
experiences with broadband, and the experiences of edge innovators 
 
 81. See Ray G. Besing, The Intersection of Sherman Act Section 2 and the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996: What Should Congress Do?, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 3–4 (2005) (describing the legal and lobbying battles that culminated in the 
passage of the 1996 Act); Thomas W. Hazlett, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996: 
Comment on Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 CONN. L. REV. 217, 219–21 (1996) (positing a theory 
of regulatory change based “on the self-interests of the various policymakers and influential 
pressure groups”). 
 82. Senator John McCain called the legislation the “Leave No Lobbyist Behind Act of 
1996.” 149 CONG. REC. 21,874 (2003) (statement of Sen. McCain). 
 83. Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1268 (2008). 
 84. See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1, 
17–19 (Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order) (delineating the scope of the open Internet rules). 
 85. The networks that carry traffic between local Internet access providers are referred to 
as backbones. There is no one Internet backbone, but these high-capacity core networks are 
sometimes referred to collectively as “the backbone.” 
 86. See Werbach, supra note 83, at 1250–57 (“At a deep level, the internet is 
interconnection. Hence the name, ‘in-ter-net.’”); Werbach, supra note 25, at 367–69 (“[T]he 
primary function of the Internet protocol is to enable independent data networks to federate 
into a single meta-network.”). 
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seeking to deliver new services to those users, depend at least as 
much on traffic flows between broadband access providers and other 
networks as on traffic flows between those providers and their own 
end users or directly connected content providers. The FCC’s Open 
Internet Order does not touch these practices. 
A dispute between Comcast and Level 3 illustrates the failings of 
the existing approach. The controversy involves two major Internet 
network operators, Comcast and Level 3 Communications, but its 
genesis lies with a company that owns no network facilities: Netflix. 
Netflix offers a streaming video service that provides subscribers with 
immediate access to movies over the Internet.87 Netflix has been 
exceptionally successful with this service offering.88 Estimates are that 
Netflix streaming traffic now represents one-fifth of all peak U.S. 
Internet traffic.89 However, Netflix does not own a network.90 To 
deliver its content to subscribers, it must purchase capacity from 
network providers. Several competitors offer transmission services 
across the Internet backbone. Until late 2010, Netflix contracted with 
content delivery networks (CDNs), primarily Akamai and 
LimeLight.91 CDNs distribute content across local caching services 
hosted within ISPs’ networks, so that content is delivered to the end 
user locally rather than across the backbone.92  
 
 87. Thanks to a variety of business arrangements, this Internet-based service can be 
delivered to television sets through set-top boxes such as TiVo or through game consoles such 
as the Xbox 360. Press Release, Netflix & Roku, Netflix Teams with Streaming Media 
Innovator Roku on Player that Instantly Streams Movies from Netflix Directly to the TV (May 
20, 2008), available at http://netflix.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=272; Instantly Watch 
Movies & TV Episodes from Netflix on Your TiVo Box, TIVO, http://www.tivo.com/mytivo/
product-features/on-demand/watch-netflix/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011); Greg Peters, 
Wii and PS3 to Be Disc-Free, THE NETFLIX BLOG (Oct. 18, 2010, 8:23 AM), http://blog.netflix
.com/2010/10/wii-and-ps3-to-be-disc-free.html. 
 88. See Michael Liedtke, Netflix Expects Video Streaming to Drown Out DVDs, BOS. 
GLOBE, Nov. 22, 2010, http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2010/11/22/netflix_
expects_video_streaming_to_drown_out_dvds (“[Netflix’s] 17 million subscribers watch more 
hours of Internet-streamed video each month than they do on the DVDs they get through the 
mail.”). 
 89. See Peter Burrows, Will Video Kill the Internet, Too?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 
Dec. 6, 2010, at 43, 43 (“[Netflix] now accounts for 20 percent of all Internet traffic during the 
typical American evening . . . .”). 
 90. See Todd Spangler, The Netflix Niche, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 31, 2011, at 10 
(describing how Netflix operates). 
 91. See Market Talk: Oppenheimer Cuts Limelight, Akamai on Netflix Concerns, DOW 
JONES NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 15, 2010, available at Factiva, Doc. DJ00000020101115e6bf0003h. 
 92. See Werbach, supra note 83, at 1254 (“CDNs such as Akamai operate distributed 
networks of caching servers, hosted on large numbers of networks, which automatically serve 
content to end users from nearby caches.”). 
WERBACH IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 4/14/2011  6:24:49 PM 
2011] THE NETWORK UTILITY 1781 
In early November 2010, Netflix agreed to switch to Level 3, a 
large wholesale network operator, for its streaming distribution.93 
Level 3 has not traditionally been a major player in the CDN market. 
Instead, it offers transit service across its national backbone for large 
enterprises and other networks.94 It also peers with other top-tier 
backbones, which means that it engages in settlement-free exchange 
of traffic, on the assumption that traffic flows between large networks 
are relatively equal.95 The FCC does not regulate commercial 
practices in the backbone market, so network operators are generally 
free to hash out privately whether a relationship will be considered 
peering (no money exchanged) or transit.96 
Among the companies to which Level 3 provides transit service 
is Comcast, the largest U.S. residential broadband access provider, as 
well as the largest cable television provider.97 Comcast pays Level 3 to 
carry traffic from its local networks to other endpoints on the 
Internet.98 When Level 3 began carrying Netflix traffic, however, the 
traffic flows between it and Comcast suddenly changed. Level 3 was 
now delivering roughly five times as much traffic to Comcast as 
Comcast was delivering to it.99 Comcast, arguing that it would now be 
 
 93. See Cecilia Kang, Level 3 Accuses Comcast of Unfairly Using Its Clout as the Dominant 
U.S. Cable Provider, POST TECH (Nov. 29, 2010, 8:20 PM ET), http://voices.washingtonpost
.com/posttech/2010/11/comcast_hit_with_two_net_neutr.html (“Level 3 is the exclusive 
backbone Internet service provider for Netflix . . . .”). 
 94. See id. (“Level 3’s backbone networks deliver content such as videos, retailing Web 
sites and games to networks operated by cable and phone companies, which then transmit the 
data over the ‘last mile’ of Internet pipes into American homes.”). 
 95. See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 45, 47–52 (2003) (describing how and why Internet backbones 
“cooperate with one another by interconnecting their networks”). 
 96. See id. at 48 (“[I]nterconnection between Internet backbone providers is not currently 
regulated by the Federal Communications Commission . . . or any other government agency. 
Instead, the backbones are self-regulated . . . .”). 
 97. See High-Speed Internet, COMCAST INVESTOR RELATIONS, http://www.cmcsk.com/
high-speed-internet.cfm (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) (“With nearly 15 million customers, 
Comcast is the nation’s largest provider of residential high-speed Internet services.”); Video, 
COMCAST INVESTOR RELATIONS, http://www.cmcsk.com/video.cfm (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) 
(“With 24.2 million video subscribers, Comcast is the nation’s leading provider of cable 
television.”). 
 98. Press Release, Comcast Corp., Comcast Extends National Fiber Infrastructure (Dec. 7, 
2004), available at http://www.comcast.com/About/PressRelease/PressReleaseDetail.ashx?PRID
=183. 
 99. See Nate Anderson, Peering Problems: Digging into the Comcast/Level 3 Grudgematch, 
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 9, 2010, 11:20 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/12/
comcastlevel3.ars (“Comcast says that, with Level 3’s addition of Netflix in the new year, the 
traffic ratios will be as high as 5:1.”); Kang, supra note 93 (recording a Comcast executive stating 
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forced to bear the costs of these higher traffic flows, imposed on 
Level 3 the recurrent fee it charges to CDNs that deliver traffic 
destined for its customers.100 In response, Level 3 put out a press 
release attacking Comcast for erecting a “toll booth” on the Internet 
and claiming that Comcast’s actions represented a violation of the 
FCC’s open Internet principles.101 The FCC has launched an 
investigation.102 It has not, however, given any indication that it will 
take action, and there is no precedent for intervention in disputes of 
this kind. 
The FCC has never chosen to address the Internet backbone 
market, in part because it has always deemed competitive forces 
 
that Level 3’s traffic was “highly imbalanced”); Peer Pressure, ECONOMIST BABBAGE BLOG 
(Dec. 23, 2010, 8:25 AM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/12/connecting_
internets (reporting Comcast’s statement that Level 3 “had massively increased the data flow 
over the two firms’ connection”); Brian Stelter, Netflix Partner Says Comcast ‘Toll’ Threatens 
Online Video Delivery, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER BLOG (Nov. 29, 2010, 6:13 PM), http://
mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/netflix-partner-says-comcast-toll-threatens-online-
video-delivery (reporting a Comcast executive’s observation that Level 3 was “sharply 
increasing its traffic”). This ratio exceeds the criteria for peering under Comcast’s peering 
policy. See Comcast Settlement-Free Interconnection (SFI) Policy, COMCAST, http://www.
comcast.com/peering (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) (“Applicant must maintain a traffic scale 
between its network and Comcast that enables a general balance of inbound versus outbound 
traffic.”). It appears that it also exceeds the terms of Comcast’s transit agreement with Level 3, 
given that the agreement was based on the assumption that Level 3 would be providing service 
to Comcast. Because all of these agreements are private, however, the terms cannot be publicly 
verified. 
 100. Press Release, Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., Level 3 Communications Issues Statement 
Concerning Comcast’s Actions (Nov. 29, 2010), available at http://www.level3.com/en/About-
Us/Newsroom/Press-Release-Archive/2010/2010-11-29-level3-statement-comcast.aspx; Stelter, 
supra note 99. A group of peering experts sent a letter to the FCC disputing Comcast’s claims 
that traffic imbalances were still the proper mechanism for determining peering and transit 
policies. See Letter from Bradley D. Bopp, Dir. of Eng’g, NationalNet, et al. to Julius 
Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, et al. 1–2 (Dec. 20, 2010), available at http://shell.voxel.net/
~arothsch/ratio-petition-v3.pdf (“[T]raffic ratios are an outdated and misleading metric for 
determining equality and financial burden . . . .”). 
 101. See Press Release, Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., supra note 100 (“Level 3 believes Comcast’s 
current position violates the spirit and letter of the FCC’s proposed Internet Policy 
principles . . . .” (quoting Thomas Stortz, Chief Legal Officer, Level 3 Communications, Inc.) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 102. See Brian Stelter, F.C.C. Investigates Complaint Against Comcast, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA 
DECODER BLOG (Nov. 30, 2010, 3:53 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/f-
c-c-investigates-complaint-against-comcast (“The chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission said Tuesday that the agency was looking into claims by Level 3 Communications 
that Comcast had unfairly erected a toll booth that ‘threatens the open Internet.’”). There has 
been to date no formal complaint filed with the FCC, so the Commission is under no obligation 
to take any action. 
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sufficient.103 The FCC never explicitly concluded that backbones were 
outside of its authority. It simply never adopted rules applicable to 
that marketplace, which began as an unregulated service provided by 
small, independent information-services providers.104 There is a good 
legal argument that the backbone should be treated as 
telecommunications under the 1996 Act because it involves the pure 
transport of information.105 And indeed, interconnection in the 
backbone bears a strong resemblance to certain interconnection 
issues the FCC regulates in the telephone world, often involving the 
same companies.106 The FCC has simply never taken up these 
arguments. 
The economics involved are complicated. In principle, there is no 
reason why one provider or the other should pay the fee. The 
distribution chain between Netflix, Level 3, and Comcast is a classic 
two-sided market, in which revenues come from both the provider—
in this case, Netflix—and end users.107 Higher fees from Comcast to 
Level 3 could increase Netflix’s costs, which Netflix might then have 
to recoup by charging more to its customers. On the other hand, if 
Comcast is correct that Netflix’s video traffic imposes substantial 
costs on its network, Comcast might have to charge slightly higher 
rates to all of its users because of the Netflix video influx. As a policy 
matter, the FCC might therefore have to weigh its desire for greater 
broadband deployment against its desire to promote innovative new 
 
 103. See Kende, supra note 95, at 54–55 (describing the economic relationships among 
networks comprising the Internet). 
 104. See id. at 54–56 (“For more than thirty years, the Commission has sought to avoid 
imposing unnecessary common carrier regulation on providers of computer services that rely on 
the nation’s telecommunications infrastructure for transmission of those services but do not 
themselves provide telecommunications services to the public.”). 
 105. See id. at 55 & n.105 (noting that services that involve pure transport of information are 
“basic” services, and that “[t]he Commission has concluded that [‘telecommunications service’] 
correspond[s] to the categor[y] of basic”). 
 106. See James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 225, 268–79 (2002) (“[O]ne could imagine the FCC imposing a tariffing requirement 
[in the Internet interconnection market], which has been the traditional means of enforcing a 
common carrier’s interconnection obligation and is still employed in markets in which the 
telecommunications carrier has market power.” (footnote omitted)). 
 107. See J. Scott Marcus, IP-Based NGNs and Interconnection: The Debate in Europe, 72 
COMM. & STRATEGIES 17, 17–19 (2008) (arguing that economic models holding that only the 
initiator, and not the caller, received value from a call were even less applicable in the age of 
Internet networks); Jean Tirole & Jean-Charles Rochet, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 
37 RAND J. ECON. 645, 645 (2006) (defining a two-sided market as one “in which one or 
several platforms enable interactions between end-users and try to get the two (or multiple) 
sides ‘on board’ by appropriately charging each side”). 
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broadband applications, which might in turn stimulate broadband 
adoption. Many technical complexities are involved in assessing 
network costs for Internet traffic, however, including whether 
interconnection between networks occurs close to or far from end 
users.108 
The Comcast–Level 3 dispute thus highlights the sorts of 
questions the FCC would have to ask to develop appropriate policies 
for a converged broadband environment. The problem is not that 
these questions are challenging, but that they are not even on the 
table. Eight years or more of intensive debate about network 
neutrality at the FCC have not even touched the proper treatment of 
network-to-network relationships in the Internet backbone. Perhaps 
the FCC investigation of the dispute will spur a new effort to expand 
the scope of the open Internet proceeding, but that seems unlikely. 
The FCC has treated regulation of data networking as the exception, 
rather than the rule, for so long that it has become almost impossible 
for the agency to shift gears. 
C. The Fundamental Issue: Computing Meets Communications 
Boundary-drawing is a difficult challenge for any regulator.109 If a 
category is declared subject to regulation, actors have an incentive to 
show that they do not fit that category. This problem grows larger as 
the regulatory obligations incident upon the classification grow. Thus, 
if a “telecommunications service provider” is subject to a litany of 
restrictions, none of which applies to an “information service 
provider,” companies have strong incentives to fit themselves into the 
 
 108. See Letter from Bradley D. Bopp et al. to Julius Genachowski et al., supra note 100, at 
1 (“Traffic ratios were commonly considered by networks seeking interconnection in the late 
1990s, where much of the traffic exchanged was subsequently hauled large distances, with 
disparities in route-miles traveled and associated costs. In contrast, today, large access and 
content networks interconnect at a number of carrier-neutral collocation facilities around the 
country, where technical practices are employed to ensure that data is transmitted to an access 
network at the location closest to its requesting ‘eyeballs.’”). 
 109. See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, ALBERT L. DANIELSEN & DAVID R. KAMERSCHEN, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 26–66 (1988) (discussing the boundaries between 
competition and regulation); ROBERT B. HORWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM 22–
45 (1989) (discussing the boundaries of several regulatory theories for public utilities such as 
telecommunications); ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
INSTITUTIONS 3–8, 11–12 (1988) (explaining the legal and economic reasons behind regulation); 
James W. McKie, Regulation and the Free Market: The Problem of Boundaries, 1 BELL J. ECON. 
6, 7 (1970) (“[T]he boundary problem [for public utilities] is there. It is becoming more difficult, 
and presenting new aspects for solution, as organization and technology develop and 
competitive activities press more closely upon the regulated ones.”). 
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latter bucket.110 These boundary problems generate both type I and 
type II errors.111 Regulators are reluctant to let regulated companies 
out of the box, even if some of the restrictions are excessive, and they 
are reluctant to put new services inside of the box, even when they 
bear the indicia of regulated services. 
The 1996 Act gave the FCC this sort of choice between two poor 
options. It could either classify all Internet-related services—with the 
possible exception of voice over Internet protocol (VoIP)—as 
information services, even if offered by carriers, or force a sharp 
division between the regulated and unregulated components of 
Internet access. The latter option was particularly unsatisfying 
because cable operators, which had become the largest providers of 
broadband access, had never been subject to common carrier 
regulation.112 The FCC would have had either to treat broadband 
access by telephone and cable companies differently, creating a 
competitive imbalance, or to impose Title II open-access mandates on 
cable companies traditionally subject to a different set of rules. The 
FCC’s decision was controversial, but it was an imperfect response to 
an imperfect statutory framework. 
Any system in which obligations depend heavily on service 
classification will be problematic when applied to digital systems that 
transgress those boundaries. Even when a classification decision 
initially produces salutary effects, it will only be a matter of time 
before it begins to unravel. The FCC tied its conclusion that 
broadband access was an information service to its longstanding 
policy of “unregulation” toward the Internet.113 The FCC has 
repeatedly expressed the concern that if it puts some Internet-based 
 
 110. See Rob Frieden, The FCC’s Name Game: How Shifting Regulatory Classifications 
Affect Competition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1275, 1303 (2004) (noting that traditional 
telecommunications service providers are being threatened by the proliferation of less-regulated 
information service providers). 
 111. A type I error is a false positive, and a type II error is a false negative. 
 112. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other 
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4843–49 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed 
rulemaking); see also John T. Nakahata, Broadband Regulation at the Demise of the 1934 Act: 
The Challenge of Muddling Through, 12 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 169, 171 (2004) (noting that 
cable operators “historically had not been treated as common carriers”). 
 113. See Oxman, supra note 2, at 18–20 (describing the FCC’s “unregulation” of 
broadband). 
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services within the purview of traditional telecommunications 
regulation, it will begin down a slippery slope.114 
For example, this concern explains the FCC’s actions regarding 
VoIP. Even in the 1990s, some VoIP services were, to users, virtually 
identical to traditional telephony.115 On the one hand, the obligations 
of Title II could not hinge on the technical protocol employed for 
outwardly identical services. On the other hand, imposition of 
interstate access charges and regulatory obligations for the nascent 
VoIP industry would have been disastrous, and imposition of those 
obligations on pure computer software providers such as Vocaltec 
made no sense.116 The FCC in the 1990s saw no reason to move 
forward quickly in tackling this thorny issue: VoIP was a new service 
with few customers and was evolving quickly. Unfortunately, some 
members of Congress disagreed. They saw unregulated VoIP 
threatening subsidies for universal telephone service, because only 
telecommunications carriers were required to contribute to the 
subsidy pool.117 In 1998, the Senate Appropriations Committee 
directed the FCC to explain how it could avoid treating VoIP as a 
regulated Title II service.118 
The FCC issued what became known as the Stevens Report, 
named for the chairman of the Appropriations Committee who 
 
 114. See, e.g., William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC, The Road Not Taken: Building a 
Broadband Future for America, Remarks Before the National Cable Television Association 
(June 15, 1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/spwek921.html (explaining 
his opposition to open access obligations on cable broadband Internet access providers because 
they might chill investment). 
 115. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 FCC Rcd. 11,501, 11,550 (1998) 
(report to Congress) (“Indeed, from the end-user perspective, these types of phone-to-phone IP 
telephony service providers seem virtually identical to traditional circuit-switched carriers.”). 
 116. See id. at 11,543 (“As a general matter, Title II requirements apply only to the 
‘provi[sion]’ or ‘offering’ of telecommunications. Without regard to whether 
‘telecommunications’ is taking place in the transmission of computer-to-computer IP telephony, 
the Internet service provider does not appear to be ‘provid[ing]’ telecommunications to its 
subscribers.” (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(46), 254(d) 
(Supp. II 2007))). 
 117. See 150 CONG. REC. S9069 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 2004) (statement of Sen. Alexander) 
(“[T]raditional long-distance services are suffering, in part from the increase in telephone calls 
made over the Internet with VOIP service.”). 
 118. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 623, 111 Stat. 2440, 2521–22 (directing the 
FCC to review its interpretation of the 1996 Act and to explain its compatibility with the Act’s 
plain language). 
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requested it.119 The report suggested that “phone to phone” VoIP 
services could fit well within the Title II definition.120 But the FCC 
stopped just short of the regulatory line, appropriately concerned 
about chilling effects on innovation and investment. Once drawn, 
however, the tentative distinction gradually became a solid barrier. 
The FCC waited years to take on the question of whether some VoIP 
services might be classified as regulated telephony, and it has not 
issued a definitive judgment as of early 2011.121 
Lines are easier to draw in static industries, in which different 
categories of companies are easily distinguished. The effort grows far 
more difficult in a fast-changing environment such as the current 
telecommunications and data networking sector. 
The difficulties the FCC faces can be traced to the distinction 
between communications and computing. The FCC’s actions suggest 
that the agency sees itself as a regulator of communications and seeks 
to avoid the possibility that it will regulate computing.122 It sees the 
distinctions in its prior decisions and the 1996 Act as institutionalizing 
that division. And it reads the history of the personal computer and 
the Internet as evidence that computing-based industries create 
wealth and innovation when quarantined from the obligations of 
communications regulation. None of these conclusions is incorrect. 
The Internet would not have developed if it had been left to the 
incumbent communications providers to build it, nor would it have 
survived if those operators had been given free rein to stifle its 
growth. Framing the issue this way, however, obscures a great deal. 
In reality, communications and computing are connected and 
becoming more so. The strategy of keeping one in the regulatory box 
and the other outside no longer makes sense. Computer-based 
services are no longer strangers in the strange land of 
communications networks. The important regulatory issues are at the 
edges and inside of these networked platforms. 
 
 119. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 FCC Rcd. at 11,519–25 
(describing Senator Ted Stevens’s involvement in the report). 
 120. See id. at 11,543–44 (suggesting that “phone-to-phone” VoIP services “bear the 
characteristics of ‘telecommunications services’”). 
 121. See Werbach, supra note 19, at 44–47 (describing the history of the FCC’s regulation of 
VoIP services). 
 122. See Oxman, supra note 2, at 6 (“The story of the Commission and its role in the 
development of the Internet highlights the benefits of the FCC’s early deregulatory efforts to 
facilitate the growth of computer applications offered over the public telecommunications 
network.” (footnote omitted)). 
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II.  THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The FCC’s current trajectory began long before the classification 
of broadband access in 2002, the legislative reforms of 1996, or even 
the Computer II and Computer III123 decisions that distinguished 
regulated “basic” from unregulated “enhanced” services in the 1980s. 
In fact, the FCC’s policy approach toward networked-data platforms 
began before the Internet existed; it even predated the Internet’s 
predecessor, the ARPANet. The current tussle over FCC Internet 
regulation is a direct descendant of a set of decisions the FCC made 
in its Computer I124 proceeding, which was launched in 1968 in 
response to the technological vision of the computer utility. And the 
basic questions the FCC confronted then are considerably older still. 
They involve the regulatory treatment of companies in a special 
position to provide essential services or exercise competitive 
bottlenecks—public utilities. 
A.  “Affected with a Public Interest” 
“Utility” is a term, much like “innovation,” that is widely used 
but curiously immune to precise definition.125 Most descriptions of the 
concept are circular: a utility is a company, such as a telephone 
network, water, or electricity provider, which has special obligations 
because it functions as a public utility.126 Yet there is a long history of 
 
 123. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third 
Computer Inquiry) (Computer III), 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (report and order). 
 124. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and 
Communication Services and Facilities (Computer I Final Decision), 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) 
(final decision and order). 
 125. I refer here to “utility” in the sense of a regulated provider of certain services. See 
Pablo T. Spiller & Mariano Tommasi, The Institutions of Regulation: An Application to Public 
Utilities, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 515, 519 (Claude Menard & Mary 
M. Shirley eds., 2005) (defining a utility as a service with large sunk costs, economies of scale, 
and massive consumption). In economics, “utility” has a precise meaning: the total satisfaction 
derived from consumption of a good or service. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF 
MICROECONOMICS 442–43 (5th ed. 2008); JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, 
THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 15–16 (1946). 
 126. See COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2592 (6th ed. 1993) (“[I]ndustry required by law to 
render adequate service in its field at reasonable prices to all who apply for it. Public utilities 
frequently operate as monopolies in their market. In the United States, public utilities are most 
commonly involved in the business of supplying consumers with water, electricity, telephone, 
natural gas, and other necessary services.”); WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 173 
(2d ed. 1998) (“A public utility is a business that furnishes an everyday necessity to the public at 
large. Public utilities provide water, electricity, natural gas, telephone service, and other 
essentials.”); see also Rick Geddes, Public Utilities, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
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legal doctrine and case law on the regulatory treatment of public 
utilities, mostly from the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.127 To allow the federal government to impose social and 
worker protections, U.S. courts developed a doctrine permitting 
regulation of private business activities that were “affected with a 
public interest.”128 At the time, the Supreme Court was skeptical of 
the regulation of private businesses without an express constitutional 
mandate.129 Modern courts have little difficulty finding government 
actions supported under either the general police power or the power 
to regulate interstate commerce. During the Progressive Era, 
however, expansive government desires to regulate the terms and 
conditions of powerful corporate interests ran up against limited 
doctrinal theories of government power.130 
Certain businesses, such as ferries and ports, had been subject to 
limitations on their business practices for centuries; these limitations 
typically required them to provide service to all comers on a 
nondiscriminatory basis.131 Progressives built on this foundation to 
justify reforms that restricted businesses’ dealings with their 
customers, employees, and competitors. The first legal challenge was 
to fit this “common carriage” concept into a doctrinal rubric. The 
 
ECONOMICS 1162 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (“[Public utility] 
industries share a common ‘network’ structure, in that they have an extensive distribution 
system of lines, pipes, or routes requiring the use of public rights of way, often with strong 
physical linkages between component parts.”). 
 127. The concept was well-entrenched in American jurisprudence in the early twentieth 
century. See Gustavus H. Robinson, The Public Utility Concept in American Law, 41 HARV. L. 
REV. 277, 277 (1928) (“Since not long after the Civil War we have accustomed ourselves to 
‘private business’ as one large category, and ‘public business’ as another.”). 
 128. Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089, 1100–01 
(1930). See generally BRUCE WYMAN, THE SPECIAL LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE 
CORPORATIONS AND ALL OTHERS ENGAGED IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT (1911) (discussing the 
“affected with a public interest” doctrine); Charles Fairman, The So-Called Granger Cases, 
Lord Hale, and Justice Bradley, 5 STAN. L. REV. 587 (1953) (same); Breck P. McAllister, Lord 
Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1930) (same). 
 129. See Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional 
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3, 24 (1991) (explaining that, during the Lochner era, the Court 
generally believed that the “concepts used to resolve constitutional disputes must be contained 
in the Constitution, or must so clearly effectuate goals contained in the Constitution that for all 
intents and purposes they may be conceived of as being contained in the Constitution”). 
 130. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 880 (1987) (“In the 
Lochner era itself, of course, the police power could not be used to help those unable to protect 
themselves in the marketplace.”). 
 131. See Hamilton, supra note 128, at 1093–94 (discussing Lord Hale’s argument that 
wharves necessary to the public could not charge excessive rates for use). 
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second was to expand common carriage to cover the newly emerging 
business powers of an industrializing nation. 
The leading case, Munn v. Illinois,132 was decided in 1876.133 The 
Supreme Court held that the state of Illinois could set rates and other 
terms for grain elevators on the shores of Lake Michigan.134 The 
Court concluded that the grain elevators, although not traditional 
common carriers, were nonetheless “affected with a public interest.”135 
As such, they were subject to greater regulatory oversight than 
private businesses. The Court in Munn traced this doctrine to an 
eighteenth-century treatise by English jurist Matthew Hale.136  
In the years following Munn, the courts struggled to define the 
boundaries of “affectation with the public interest.”137 The doctrine 
was criticized for being nothing more than a catch-all category for 
things that the courts wanted to regulate.138 Even those who defended 
it acknowledged that the term was essentially a marker for allowing 
legislatures to act in appropriate ways to enforce public policy 
objectives.139 
Finally in 1934, in Nebbia v. New York,140 the Supreme Court 
gave up the game: “The phrase ‘affected with a public interest’ can, in 
the nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for 
adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good.”141 The 
Court, under its more expansive New Deal vision of the Constitution, 
was willing to permit public regulation of private businesses without 
the legal fiction of some distinct industrial category. Although the 
constitutional basis for development of the “affectation with the 
public interest” test disappeared in the first half of the twentieth 
century, the concept endures. At a general level, the endurance of the 
 
 132. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
 133. Id. at 113. 
 134. Id. at 130–31. 
 135. Id. at 127. 
 136. Sir Matthew Hale, De Portibus Maris, in A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO 
THE LAW OF ENGLAND 72, 79 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1787). 
 137. See Hamilton, supra note 128, at 1096–1106 (describing post-Munn cases in which 
courts came to varying conclusions about what “affectation with the public interest” meant). 
 138. See Robinson, supra note 127, at 280–81 (arguing that extensions of the doctrine to 
grain elevators, stockyards, and a cold storage business were accomplished “by the method of 
real or fictional analogy”). 
 139. See Hamilton, supra note 128, at 1106–07 (“The question is to be approached as an 
aspect of the public policy for the control of an industry.”). 
 140. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 141. Id. at 536. 
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concept, despite its analytical flaws, demonstrates that even in the 
limited governmental area, some regulation of private market actors 
is necessary to avoid market failures.142  
More specifically, the public-interest concept made the jump 
from common law doctrine to legislative command for the 
administrative agency overseeing the telecommunications sector. The 
Radio Act of 1927,143 the precursor to the 1934 Communications Act, 
which established the modern FCC, introduced the requirement that 
wireless licensees serve the “public interest, convenience, or 
necessity.”144 This phrase was incorporated into both the 
Communications Act and the 1996 Act as a central policy mandate. 
Regulated common carriers such as AT&T were given extraordinary 
protection by the government against competition, and, in return, 
they bore special obligations as public utilities. Only a regulated 
carrier, for example, could provide “message switching,” or services 
analogous to telephone service, but it had to do so at rates and terms 
approved by both the FCC and state regulatory commissions.145  
Since the 1970s, there has been a dramatic shift away from 
intrusive public utility regulation and toward the facilitation of 
competition.146 Some remnants of public utility regulation—like 
exclusive franchises, rate regulation, tariffing, and other 
mechanisms—remain in energy and transportation, but they have 
 
 142. See Paul Kens, Property, Liberty, and the Rights of the Community: Lessons from 
Munn v. Illinois 7 (May 21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1612824 (“The pervasiveness of regulations of business practices [in the nineteenth century] 
undoubtedly reflects an understanding among the era’s people, policy makers, and judges that, 
while the right to own private property was inviolable, the uses to which it might be put was 
subject to regulation.”). 
 143. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162. 
 144. Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public Interest” Standard: The Search for 
the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 606 (1998) (discussing the legislative history of the 
“public interest” standard in the 1927 Radio Act); see also Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: 
Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863, 870–71 (2004) 
(discussing the history of the Radio Act of 1927). 
 145. These limitations were relaxed over the years and were substantially transformed by 
the 1996 Act. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 2, at 69–74 (describing the goals of the 
1996 Act with regard to wireline carriers). 
 146. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of 
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998) (describing the dramatic changes in 
the United States’ approach to regulating communications in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century). 
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largely disappeared from telecommunications.147 The 1996 Act 
represented a decisive break from the model of regulated 
monopoly.148 The FCC’s role is now to promote competition through 
access regulation and other means, not to substitute for it. 
The concept of the public utility remains relevant, even as the 
regulatory approaches historically associated with it have disappeared 
from the communications sector. As many commentators have 
recognized, and as courts eventually acknowledged, the doctrine was 
never really about a well-defined class of monopoly service 
providers.149 Public utility regulation was always a means to serve 
public policy ends for network platforms and other businesses with 
bottleneck control. Even in the current deregulatory era, the 
possibility of market failure supports both antitrust and sectoral 
regulation. Take away the historical association between public utility 
regulation in telecommunications and exclusive monopoly franchises, 
and what endures is the recognition that some private firms can raise 
public concerns. As Professors Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale have 
pointed out, regulatory mechanisms to promote fairness and 
accessibility have been applied to many private entities that wield 
significant exclusionary power.150 The first question to ask, therefore, 
is whether particular services and service providers raise the same 
concerns that have motivated public utility regulation. In the 1960s, 
many experts in the new field of computer science were convinced 
such concerns were on the horizon. Unsurprisingly, they described 
the emerging systems with the term “computer utility.” 
 
 147. For a discussion on some of the traditional regulatory approaches that were eschewed 
by the 1996 Act, see Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New 
Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 63–69 (2007). 
 148. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (“An Act to promote competition and reduce 
regulation . . . .”). 
 149. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and 
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1175–76 (2008) (“When a 
private party occupies an extraordinary position of power that makes it indispensable to others 
for obtaining certain important resources, goods, or services, and when alternatives are very 
limited, traditionally there has been more receptiveness to the application of fairness and 
accountability norms.”); see also Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The 
Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 112 (2010) 
(developing further the arguments for Internet intermediaries more generally). 
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B. The Computer Utility Vision 
The convergence of communications and computing is not a new 
phenomenon. In fact, it was an anomaly that most computers during 
the period roughly between 1980 and 2000 were individual PCs that 
did not interconnect with one another remotely. Systems that used 
circuits from telecommunications operators to deliver computing 
services at a distance were developed not long after the first digital 
computers were created.151 By the 1960s, it was estimated that more 
than half of all computers would be tied into communications 
networks within a decade.152 The interdependence of computers and 
communications was a hot topic of debate in the late 1960s, before 
the Internet even existed.153 And major network operators at that time 
were cognizant that computers would increasingly become the 
technical foundation for the telecommunications system itself. The 
debate at the FCC about how to keep computers out of the regulatory 
quagmire actually began as a discussion about how to bring them in. 
The term for the original vision of computing fused with 
communications was the computer utility. 
The phrase “the computer utility,” though it has faded from use, 
was widely employed among computer scientists and related thinkers 
in the 1960s.154 These researchers had a strong belief that centralized 
 
 151. See infra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
 152. Bernard Strassburg, The Computer Utility—Some Regulatory Implications, 9 
JURIMETRICS J. 19, 20 (1968) (“It is predicted . . . that by 1970 some 60 percent of all computers 
will be tied into the nation’s communications network . . . .”). 
 153. See, e.g., Manley R. Irwin, The Computer Utility: Competition or Regulation?, 76 YALE 
L.J. 1299, 1299 (1967) (“Within the decade, electronic data centers will provide computational 
power to the general public in a way somewhat analogous to today’s distribution of electricity. 
Computer systems will blanket the United States, establishing an informational grid to permit 
the mass storage, processing, and consumption of a variety of data services . . . .”); Delbert 
Smith, The Interdependence of Computer and Communications Services and Facilities: A 
Question of Federal Regulation, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 829 (1968) (“Numerous and 
sophisticated interconnections between computer and communication services and facilities 
have raised problems of regulatory policy that are aggravated by the anomaly of partial 
regulation: communications carriers are regulated under the Communications Act of 1934, but 
computer services remain thus far unregulated.” (footnote omitted)). 
 154. See, e.g., C.C. BARNETT, JR., B.R. ANDERSON, W.N. BANCROFT, R.T. BRADY, D.L. 
HANSEN, H. SIMMONS, D.C. SNYDER, D. WECHSLER & J.L. WILCOX, THE FUTURE OF THE 
COMPUTER UTILITY (1967); D.F. PARKHILL, THE CHALLENGE OF THE COMPUTER UTILITY 
(1966); Greenberger, supra note 1; Elizabeth Fowler, Computer Utility Set, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 
1965, at 45; J.C.R. Licklider & Robert W. Taylor, The Computer as a Communication Device, 
SCI. & TECH., Apr. 1968, reprinted in SYS. RESEARCH CTR., RESEARCH REPORT 61, IN 
MEMORIAM: J.C.R. LICKLIDER 1915–1990, at 21 (1990), available at http://www.hpl.hp.com/
techreports/Compaq-DEC/SRC-RR-61.pdf; Paul Baran, Communication Policy Issues for the 
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networked computing systems represented a major new class of 
public utility alongside electricity and telephone systems.155 And those 
who articulated this vision understood that it meant the convergence 
of computing and regulated communications. For example, the 
introduction to the proceedings from a major series of academic 
symposia on the topic, published in 1968, concluded confidently that 
“the data processing industry and the communications common 
carriers have been led inexorably toward the concept of the computer 
utility.”156 
The technical foundations of the computer utility were time-
sharing systems that allowed many users to access the same 
mainframe computer through remote communications links.157 
Modern electronic computers were first developed around the time of 
World War II, originally for military and scientific applications. In the 
post-war years, vendors such as IBM, Honeywell, NCR, and 
Burroughs began to sell mainframe computers to large businesses.158 
These devices were so large and expensive that only the biggest 
corporations, academic institutions, and government agencies could 
 
Coming Computer Utility (RAND Paper Series, Paper No. P-3685, 1968); Chris McDonald, The 
Computer Democracy: The Politics of the Computer-Communications Infrastructure from the 
Computer Utility to the Internet (Oct. 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal). 
 155. See, e.g., Baran, supra note 154, at 2 (“There is a growing belief that we may be moving 
into an era where information processing is bought just like electricity—a computer utility.”). 
 156. Fred Gruenberger, Preface to COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS—TOWARD A 
COMPUTER UTILITY, at vii, vii (Fred Gruenberger ed., 1967). 
 157. Time sharing grew out of advances pioneered by the Air Force’s SAGE anti-aircraft 
targeting computer, which was designed at MIT. See PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 55–58 (“Of 
greatest importance . . . is the fact that the SAGE computing system is an on-line real-time time-
shared system that is simultaneously employed by many different users.”); McDonald, supra 
note 154, at 1 (“In the first half of the 1960’s, researchers at MIT and elsewhere extended the 
work done on SAGE to create a new technique known as time-sharing.”). 
 158. See NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO 
GOOGLE 49 (2008) (“Soon after the first UNIVAC appeared, IBM introduced its own line of 
mainframe computers, the 701 series, and by 1960 Honeywell, General Electric, RCA, NCR, 
Burrough, and AT&T’s Western Electric division were all in competition to sell computer 
gear.”); Greenberger, supra note 1, at 63 (“[I]n 1954, a UNIVAC was delivered to the General 
Electric Company in Louisville for business use. . . . [In 1964] there [were] probably more than 
twenty thousand computers in use within the United States, and correspondingly large numbers 
[were] installed in many other countries around the world.”). 
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afford them.159 Access was limited to a small cadre of scientists and 
staff associated with those institutions.160 
Time-sharing technology parceled out the mainframe’s 
processing capacity into extremely short time slices. Several users 
could therefore program and receive output from the same machine 
at the same time. Each user had the impression of continuous access 
to the machine.161 In an era before personal computers, time sharing 
was a revolutionary technique. It allowed anyone with the requisite 
skills access to computational capacity, instead of just those within 
major corporations and government or academic research centers.162 
The development of remote terminals expanded the power of time 
sharing still further. With these terminals, a programmer could 
interact with a computer from a remote location by using a telephone 
network link. Decades before it was feasible to build a small 
computer affordable enough for an individual user, remote time 
sharing created the experience of individual, local interaction with 
computer processing. 
A major locus of computer utility development was Project 
MAC, an early time-sharing system developed at MIT.163 Professor 
Robert Fano, the head of Project MAC, drew an analogy between 
remote networked computing and traditional utilities such as 
electricity, in that both offered on-demand access to greater capacity 
 
 159. See CARR, supra note 158, at 52 (“Because it was so expensive to buy or lease 
mainframes—the rent on a typical IBM computer was about $30,000 a month in the mid-
1960’s—a company had to keep the machine in constant use if it was to justify the expense.”). 
 160. For further discussion of the early history of computers, see Harry D. Huskey, 
Computers—Academy to Industry, in COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 156, at 
53, 53–58. 
 161. See PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 51 (noting that the computer utility includes features 
such as “[e]ssentially simultaneous use of the system by many remotely located users” and 
“[a]vailability of at least the same range of facilities and capabilities at the remote stations as the 
user would expect if he were the sole operator”). 
 162. See McDonald, supra note 154, at 3 (“A decade before computer hobbyists on the West 
Coast created the personal computer, the computer utility vision of how computing could be 
brought to the masses captured the imagination of researchers, computer businesses, and the 
popular press.”). 
 163. See R.M. Fano, The MAC System: The Computer Utility Approach, IEEE SPECTRUM, 
Jan. 1965, at 56, 56 (describing the MAC project and pointing out that MAC stood for, among 
other things, “multiple-access computer”); McDonald, supra note 154, at 1 (“In the first half of 
the 1960’s, researchers at MIT and elsewhere extended the work done on SAGE to create a new 
technique known as time-sharing.”). 
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than any individual user could maintain.164 As Fano astutely noted, 
the computer utility offered three additional benefits, compared to a 
relatively nondifferentiated input such as electricity: “a great variety 
of services,” the ability for a user to “store and retrieve his own 
private files of data and programs,” and a “convenient means for 
collaboration.”165 The research conducted through Project MAC in 
the early 1960s, along with other academic time-sharing projects, 
created broad awareness in the academic community about the 
potential of such systems.166 
Time sharing also created new business opportunities. 
Companies such as Computer Sciences Corporation, University 
Computing Corporation, and General Electric established computing 
service bureaus, which offered customers access to time-shared 
computing capacity.167 These service bureaus became a hot growth 
market in the late 1960s.168 Western Union, still a major regulated 
common carrier even though its telegraph service had been eclipsed 
by the telephone, announced plans for a major push into the 
computer utility business.169 The commercial time-sharing market was 
 
 164. See Fano, supra note 163, at 56 (discussing “the notion of a community utility capable 
of supplying computer power to each ‘customer’” that was “analogous to an electrical 
distribution system”). 
 165. Id. at 56–57. These elements—on-demand capacity, service delivery, partitioned access 
to private data or applications, and collaboration capabilities—are at the heart of today’s cloud 
computing platforms. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 166. See McDonald, supra note 154, at 5 (“Despite their very limited capabilities . . . early 
time-sharing systems made conceivable to Fano, Kennedy, and others, especially within the 
academic community, something like a public utility for computer power.”). 
 167. See HOMER R. OLDFIELD, KING OF THE SEVEN DWARFS: GENERAL ELECTRIC’S 
AMBIGUOUS CHALLENGE TO THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY, at v–vi (1996) (describing the 
creation of the GE Computer Department and noting that “the Computer Department 
pioneered in the development of time-sharing and multi-processing techniques”); McDonald, 
supra note 154, at 5 (“Numerous computer businesses latched onto the idea that time-sharing 
and the information utility were the wave of the future.”). Interestingly, IBM, the dominant 
company in the computer industry, was barred from serving as a service bureau under the terms 
of a 1956 consent decree. United States v. IBM Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,245, at 
71,125 (S.D.N.Y.). IBM nonetheless developed an offering under which a user would bring data 
to an IBM data center, process it, and pay IBM for the computer time, rather than the 
processing service per se. Smith, supra note 153, at 834. This model bears striking similarities to 
the public cloud computing model now embraced by Amazon.com and others. See infra Part 
III.B.1. 
 168. See McDonald, supra note 154, at 5 (noting that businesses invested in time-sharing 
machines in part to “take advantage of red-hot capital markets for high-tech companies”). 
 169. See id. (“Most ambitious of all was Western Union. Driven to reinvent itself as 
something more than a telegraph company . . . it announced plans in 1965 to become a national 
information utility.” (citation omitted)). 
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estimated at $70 million in 1968, but analysts at the time estimated 
that it would grow to over $1 billion in 1973.170 
The computer utility systems of the 1960s supported only a few 
dozen or hundred users simultaneously and offered text-only 
functionality that a modern PC user would find archaic. Despite these 
limitations, advocates envisioned them as the starting point for 
something far grander: national-scale public computer utilities that 
would transform business, shopping, entertainment, public services, 
and more.171 Descriptions of the computer utility from the mid-
twentieth century are eerily prescient. For example, the definition in a 
leading book on the concept, published in 1966 by Mitre Corporation 
researcher Douglas Parkhill, sounds exactly like the modern Internet: 
“As generally envisaged, a computer public utility would be a 
general-purpose public system, simultaneously making available to a 
multitude of diverse geographically distributed users a wide range of 
different information-processing services and capabilities on an on-
line basis.”172 
Parkhill described the computer utility as offering simultaneous 
access to many remote users; concurrent operation of multiple 
applications; availability of the same features remotely as a local 
computer would offer; a fee structure for access; flexibility to add 
capabilities while the system was still operating; and “a capacity for 
indefinite growth, so that as the customer load increases, the system 
can be expanded without limit by various means.”173 Parkhill and 
others also recognized that some computer utilities would be publicly 
available and some privately operated for internal corporate or 
government use.174 
 
 170. Manley R. Irwin, Computers and Communications: The Economics of Interdependence, 
34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 360, 361 (1969); see also Whole New Market, FORBES, July 1, 1969, 
at 43, 43 (predicting that, “[b]y some estimates, AT&T revenues will reach $35.5 billion in 1980, 
with at least half generated by data communications”). These rosy predictions proved 
unfounded. In hindsight, the computer utility bubble could be compared to the Internet bubble 
that inflated and then popped thirty years later. 
 171. See JOHN G. KEMENY, MAN AND THE COMPUTER 21 (1972) (arguing that “[i]t is only 
through [time-sharing] that a true symbiotic relationship between man and computer is 
possible”); PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 154–66 (arguing that a computer utility would lead to a 
new monetary system, computerized shopping, shared information services, interactive 
processing, automatic publishing, and improved economic planning and control). 
 172. PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 3. The epigraph for this Article, published in 1964, is 
another example. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 173. PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 51–52. 
 174. See id. at 52 (“In addition to the general-purpose public form, there are countless other 
possible shapes that a computer utility might take. These include private general-purpose 
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The computer utility vision also drew on a then-influential 
concept from computer science called Grosch’s law.175 Grosch’s law 
held that the performance of a computer system increases at the rate 
of the square of its cost.176 In other words, computer deployments 
have significant economies of scale, because the price-performance 
ratio of a computer increases as the computer grows. A larger 
computing installation would have an inherent performance or 
pricing advantage over a smaller one. All things being equal, 
therefore, the market would tend toward large centralized computing 
systems.177 
This vision mirrored the natural-monopoly rationale for 
communications regulation that also held sway at the time.178 
According to this theory, telecommunications networks had strong 
economies of scale due to their high fixed costs and the scale 
efficiencies of large providers such as AT&T.179 AT&T could provide 
phone calls at a lower marginal cost than smaller independent 
 
systems, private special-purpose systems such as those used for airline-reservation purposes, 
public special-purpose systems, public and private multiple-purpose systems, and a whole 
hierarchy of increasingly complex general-purpose public systems . . . .”). 
 175. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 36, at 1089 (“In computing at that time, bigger was 
better.”); George Gilder, The Information Factories, WIRED, Oct. 2006, at 178, 202 (“Google’s 
magical ability to distribute a search query among untold numbers of processors and integrate 
the results for delivery to a specific user demands the utmost central control. This triumph of 
centralization is a strange, belated vindication of Grosch’s law, the claim in 1953 that computer 
power rises by the square of the price.”). 
 176. JULIA LOBUR & LINDA NULL, THE ESSENTIALS OF COMPUTER ORGANIZATION AND 
ARCHITECTURE 589 (2006). By the end of the twentieth century, computer scientists considered 
Grosch’s law to be disproven. PAUL A. STRASSMANN, THE SQUANDERED COMPUTER 31–32 
(1997). 
 177. See STRASSMAN, supra note 176, at 31 (“[T]he profitability of computerization would 
show up when firms bought large-scale equipment and centralized the workload in data centers 
for more efficient processing.”). 
 178. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 2, at 12 (describing a natural monopoly as a 
market in which, because prices to the consumer are lowest when one firm is providing the 
service, “scale economies keep increasing until a provider is serving all customers in the 
market”); W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 337–60 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining the economics behind natural 
monopolies and proposed solutions). 
 179. A more modern argument with a similar thrust focuses on network effects. See 
NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 2, at 4–10 (arguing that certain industries, such as 
telecommunications, tend toward monopoly because “the value of the network to each user 
increases or decreases, respectively, with every addition or subtraction of other users to the 
network”); CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO 
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 173–75 (1998) (“Whether real or virtual, networks have a 
fundamental economic characteristic: the value of connecting to a network depends on the 
number of other people already connected to it.”). 
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operators, so it would eventually win out. Competition was seen as an 
impediment to efficient functioning of the market. One large 
integrated provider such as AT&T was superior to many smaller 
competitors, so it made sense for the regulatory system to enshrine 
the monopoly control of that dominant provider. These assumptions 
animated the regulatory debates that followed. 
C. Convergence Regulation: The Prequel 
During the heyday of the computer utility, researchers and 
policymakers engaged in significant discussion about the legal and 
regulatory implications of this new phenomenon.180 Because remote 
time sharing required interconnection with communications circuits, 
it impinged on the domain of the FCC. The communications 
regulatory world of the 1960s, however, was very different than that 
of the early twenty-first century. An emphasis on opening up 
competitive opportunities and facilitating market-based solutions has 
largely replaced the direct price regulation of monopoly service 
providers.181 Instead of a few vertically integrated but horizontally 
siloed providers such as AT&T and ABC, the FCC now oversees a 
fragmented and overlapping communications marketplace. These 
differences, along with the computer utility as the model for 
networked data services, explain the FCC’s subsequent path of 
quarantining data services from regulated communications. Ironically, 
the most prominent dispute of the 1960s never produced an FCC 
decision, although it laid the groundwork for what came later. 
1. Bunker Ramo.  The Bunker Ramo Corporation was an early 
computer services firm. Among other things, it developed some of the 
first electronic reservation systems for major airlines.182 It also offered 
electronic quotations services for the brokerage industry. These 
services allowed stock brokers to obtain up-to-date stock prices 
through remote data terminals in their offices. In 1964, Bunker Ramo 
developed a new service, Telequote IV, that added two-way 
 
 180. See, e.g., PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 145–52 (discussing some of the legal issues 
unique to computer public utilities). 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 146–48. 
 182. See William Shelton Mackenzie, The Legal and Competitive Aspects of the “Computer 
Utility” 51 (1968) (unpublished MBA project, the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania) 
(on file at Lippincott Library, University of Pennsylvania) (“[Bunker Ramo] is a pioneer in 
airline reservation systems, designing installations for Braniff, United, Trans-World, and 
American Airlines.”). 
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communications capabilities to its brokerage product.183 Now brokers 
could not only receive quotes, but could also place trades or 
communicate with other brokers directly through the system. The one 
problem with Bunker Ramo’s service was that to reach its customers’ 
remote terminals, the service needed communications circuits to 
connect its data center to the telephone network. 
AT&T and Western Union both refused to provide the 
requested lines.184 They argued that Bunker Ramo was improperly 
engaging in a regulated common carrier service because Telequote IV 
allowed brokers to communicate with each other.185 Resale of 
communications services was, at the time, prohibited; carriers had a 
protected monopoly enforced by the FCC. Bunker Ramo argued that 
its offering was primarily a data processing service and that the 
capacity for direct communication between brokers was merely 
incidental.186 The carriers rejected this claim and refused to provide 
the necessary lines.187 Western Union then introduced a service 
offering of its own, called SICOM, that was “virtually 
indistinguishable from Telequote IV.”188 
Bunker Ramo took its case to the FCC. It argued that AT&T 
and Western Union were improperly refusing to provide service 
because it was primarily an unregulated data processing provider, not 
a provider of regulated communications service.189 It also argued that 
Western Union was engaged in discrimination by providing the 
circuits to its own SICOM service and not to Bunker Ramo’s 
competitive offering.190 After a series of counteraccusations, AT&T 
 
 183. See id. (“In 1964–1965, the company initiated what it called Telequote IV, a stock 
quotation system for brokers, which included the capability for communication not only 
between a remote terminal and a centralized computer, but also between various customers 
subscribing to the Telequote IV service.”). 
 184. Id. at 51–52. 
 185. Id. at 53. 
 186. See id. at 52 (“Bunker-Ramo claimed that communications was ‘incidental’ to the 
overall Telequote IV service, and that broker-to-broker communications accounted for 
approximately 2% of the communication utilization.”). 
 187. Id. at 51–52. 
 188. Id. at 54. 
 189. See GERALD W. BROCK, THE SECOND INFORMATION REVOLUTION 172–73 (2003) 
(explaining that Bunker Ramo “was treated as an unregulated data processing service” and that 
the company sought to add a service that allowed buying and selling of stock prices, as opposed 
to simple stock quotations, but was denied by AT&T because AT&T believed Bunker Ramo to 
be a service communications company). 
 190. Mackenzie, supra note 182, at 56–58 (explaining that, although Western Union argued 
that “the lines it leases to customers and the lines that it uses for the SICOM offering are not 
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and Bunker Ramo negotiated a resolution of their dispute, and 
Bunker Ramo ultimately withdrew Telequote IV before the FCC had 
an opportunity to rule on it.191 
The Bunker Ramo controversy highlighted the concern that 
networked data processing services depended on access to 
communications infrastructure. The computer utility was a hybrid of 
communications and computing, but communications in the 1960s 
was a regulated monopoly. If the network operator failed to provide 
communications capacity, or did so at excessive prices or with poor 
service quality, the associated computing service could not succeed. 
These issues have only become more salient in the intervening 
years. Concerns that network operators will block or degrade 
potentially competing services lie at the heart of network neutrality. 
The Comcast–Level 3 dispute reflects the same dynamics.192 Level 3 
argued that Comcast was imposing charges for carriage of Netflix 
traffic at least in part because Netflix represented a threat to 
Comcast’s video business.193 Level 3 saw itself as a user of Comcast’s 
connections to provide information services to its customer, Netflix. 
Comcast, in essence, saw Level 3 as a carrier seeking to avoid proper 
carrier treatment. 
The Bunker Ramo incident, now forgotten, anticipated the 
network neutrality fight by forty years. It was also a significant 
impetus for the FCC’s examination of the regulatory issues that the 
new computer utilities posed.194 Partly in response to the controversy, 
the Commission began its long effort to define the boundaries 
between communications and computing. 
 
the same,” Bunker Ramo argued that “users of SICOM are being allowed to effectively share 
private lines provided by the carrier at greatly reduced rates”). 
 191. Hanan Samet, Computers and Communications: The FCC Dilemma in Determining 
What to Regulate, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 71, 75 n.19 (1978). 
 192. See supra Part I.B. 
 193. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 194. See Samet, supra note 191, at 75 (“The first computer inquiry was prompted, in part, by 
a dispute between the Bunker-Ramo Corporation and Western Union.”); Note, The FCC 
Computer Inquiry: Interfaces of Competitive and Regulated Markets, 71 MICH. L. REV. 172, 192 
(1972) (describing the “ruinously slow” legal process in the Bunker Ramo case); Barry Taub, 
Comment, Federal Communications Commission Regulation of Domestic Computer 
Communications: A Competitive Reformation, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 947, 961 (1973) (explaining the 
dispute and the FCC’s response). 
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2. Computer I.  In 1966, the FCC launched what became known 
as Computer I,195 the first of three major cycles over three decades 
referred to collectively as the Computer Inquiries.196 The Computer I 
Notice of Inquiry did not explicitly reference the Bunker Ramo 
controversy or the computer utility discussions among computer 
scientists, but it reflected the prevailing wisdom that the futures of 
communications and computing were intertwined. The FCC 
highlighted computerized stock quotation offerings as an example at 
the outset of the Notice of Inquiry, most likely an allusion to the 
Bunker Ramo incident.197 
For the time, Computer I was an intensely contested proceeding. 
Over sixty organizations filed comments, totaling over three thousand 
pages.198 The FCC found the submissions so substantial that it hired 
the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) to review them and formulate 
recommendations.199 FCC Common Carrier Bureau Chief Bernard 
Strassburg commented a few months after the proceeding was 
launched that “[t]he Inquiry has been characterized by many as the 
most important one the Commission has ever embarked upon.”200 It 
took the FCC five years from the Notice of Inquiry that began the 
proceeding to publish the Final Decision that adopted binding rules. 
 
 195. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and 
Communication Services and Facilities (Computer I NOI), 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966) (notice of 
inquiry); Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and 
Communication Services and Facilities (Computer I Tentative Decision), 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) 
(tentative decision); Computer I Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971). 
 196. See generally Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company 
Provision of Enhanced Services, 10 FCC Rcd. 8360 (1995) (notice of proposed rulemaking) 
(recounting the history of the Computer Inquiries). 
 197. See Computer I NOI, 7 F.C.C.2d at 13 (“The communications common carriers are 
rapidly becoming equipped to enter into the data processing field.”). 
 198. Donald A. Dunn, Policy Issues Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and 
Communications Services, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 369, 369 (1969). 
 199. See D.A. DUNN, STANFORD RESEARCH INST., REPORT NO. 7379B-1, POLICY ISSUES 
PRESENTED BY THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 
(1969) (summarizing and analyzing the responses to the FCC Computer Inquiry). The SRI 
report synthesized the comments and organized the issues in the proceeding, but it offered only 
limited guidance to the Commission in resolving the thorny issues. Id. at 54 (“[The data] is not 
complete enough to be of guidance in making specific and far reaching policy decisions.”). 
 200. Strassburg, supra note 152, at 19. Two decades later, the FCC reaffirmed this 
assessment. See Computer III, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 966–67 (1986) (report and order) (“The 
regulatory issues spawned by the technical confluence of regulated communications services and 
unregulated [computer networks] have been among the most important matters this 
Commission has dealt with over the past 20 years.”). 
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The Computer I Final Decision distinguished “communications” 
from “data processing” functions.201 The dominant regulatory 
question regarding the computer utility was its regulatory status.202 
Computer I answered the question of whether networked data 
processing systems were subject to the same rules as communications 
carriers. Under the regime of common carriage, communications 
network operators at the time were subject to extensive oversight, 
including tariffing and rate regulation.203 Because the line between 
ordinary competitive companies and regulated carriers was so stark, 
the classification of a service as being on one side or the other was 
momentous. Companies might not even be allowed to operate if their 
service was declared to involve regulated common carriage, or they 
might be subject to extensive regulatory obligations. 
Moreover, in a 1956 antitrust consent decree, AT&T agreed to 
limit itself to offering regulated communications services.204 The 
 
 201. See Computer I Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 270 (1971) (declining to regulate 
computers but maintaining regulations over communications under the Communications Act). 
This was later refined by the FCC into a division between “basic” and “enhanced” services. See 
Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 386 (1980) (final decision) (distinguishing “three categories of 
service—voice, ‘basic non-voice’ (BNV) and ‘enhanced non-voice’ (ENV)”); Cannon, supra 
note 56, at 183 (“Out of the analytical turmoil over classification of these services was born the 
basic versus enhanced services dichotomy.”). In 1996, Congress ratified the FCC framework, 
creating analogous statutory categories of “telecommunications” and “information services.” 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 3(a)(2), § 153(41), (48), 110 Stat. 56, 
59, 60 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), (43) (2006)). 
 202. See PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 148–52 (“[T]he time has now arrived when it 
becomes possible to consider computer power to be a likely candidate for admission to the 
public-utility club.”); Irwin, supra note 153, at 1308 (“If the FCC is to prevent the carriers from 
using its regulations to foreclose market entry, the Commission must either make it clear that 
communications services ancillary to data processing are outside its jurisdiction or else assume 
authority over computer utilities and begin regulating entrants from the data processing field.”); 
Manley R. Irwin, The Computer Utility: Market Entry in Search of Public Policy, 17 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 239, 252 (1969) (“Two options are clearly open to time-shared computer services: 
competition or regulation.”); Manley R. Irwin, The Regulatory Status of the Computer Utility, 43 
LAND ECON. 223, 224 (1967) (“If nothing else, the FCC’s investigation poses the fundamental 
question; is the computer utility destined to become a regulated utility?”). 
 203. See WYMAN, supra note 128, at 115–16 (describing the legal demands placed on 
telephone systems because they have virtual monopolies on providing communications 
services); see also Werbach, supra note 83, at 1246–50 (“[C]ommon carriage concepts were 
incorporated wholesale into the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act), which created the 
Federal Communications Commission.”). 
 204. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,246, ¶ 71,138 (D.N.J.) (“A 
T & T is enjoined and restrained from engaging . . . in any business other than the furnishing of 
common carrier communications services . . . .”); see also Susan P. Crawford, Transporting 
Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 888–91 (2009) (discussing the implications of the 1956 
consent decree). 
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dominant provider of common carrier communications services was 
thus barred from entering into unregulated lines of business, a 
restriction that would endure until the 1990s. If data processing was 
not a common carrier service, AT&T could not participate in the 
market. If, on the other hand, it was construed as falling within the 
regulatory scope of Title II of the Communications Act, remote data 
processing could only be offered by regulated common carriers. The 
computer utility marketplace was therefore either an unregulated 
space open only to new entrants or a market limited to the major 
incumbent. Competition and regulation were two mutually exclusive 
alternatives. 
The announced goal of Computer I was to consider regulation of 
data processing services.205 In other words, the original question was 
when and how such services might be brought within the ambit of the 
Communications Act. In the end, the FCC chose to define data 
processing as an unregulated offering.206 It found that “the offering of 
data processing services is essentially competitive and . . . there is no 
public interest requirement for regulation by government of such 
activities.”207 Because competition and regulation were seen as 
alternatives at the time, finding data processing to be competitive 
implied that it was not appropriate for communications regulation.208 
The FCC thus found that providers of networked data processing 
services would not be treated as carriers. It concluded that “the 
market for these services [would] continue to burgeon and flourish 
best in the existing competitive environment.”209 The computer utility 
would develop outside of Title II of the Communications Act. 
For companies already within Title II of the Communications 
Act, the decision had significant consequences as well. One important 
 
 205. See Computer I NOI, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, 15–16 (1966) (stating a goal of identifying “under 
what circumstances data processing, computer information, and message switching services, or 
any particular combination thereof—whether engaged in by established common carriers or 
other entities—are or should be subject to the provisions of the Communications Act”). 
 206. See Computer I Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 268 (“[W]e are not attempting to assert 
jurisdiction over common carriers as purveyors of computer services . . . .”). 
 207. Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 297 (1970). The FCC cited estimates 
that there were more than eight hundred data processing service bureaus in operation, that 
more than five thousand data processing companies sold excess computer time and capacity on 
their systems, and that over one thousand banks offered data processing capacity to their 
customers. Id. at 297–98. It also found that the required capital to enter the market was low and 
that the market was growing quickly. Id. 
 208. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text. 
 209. Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 298. 
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effect was to bar AT&T from entering the computer utility market, 
because of the 1956 consent decree.210 Other common carriers such as 
GTE and Western Union had no such prohibition, but the FCC 
created special obligations for their provision of data processing. The 
common carriers could do so only under terms of “maximum 
separation”—by establishing structurally separate entities that would 
deal at arms-length with the regulated carrier.211 The carriers 
considered these restrictions so onerous that they challenged them in 
court, pointing out that the FCC was attempting to regulate carriers’ 
provision of the very thing it had disclaimed any desire to regulate.212 
The Second Circuit eventually threw out some of the more extreme 
limitations, but it upheld the FCC’s basic decisions.213 
3. Lessons of a Marriage Counselor.  Computer I had important 
consequences. It drew a regulatory line for the first time between the 
regulated world of communications and the unregulated world of 
computer processing. It prevented AT&T and the other major 
telephone companies from dominating the computer utility 
marketplace by virtue of their size and advantages of incumbency. 
The result of what Professor Steve Bickerstaff calls the “shackling” of 
AT&T was to allow the data networking market to develop along a 
different path: more distributed, independent, and small-scale.214 Data 
networking delivered in this manner was a perfect fit for the PC when 
it arrived because it had never been tied to the model of large 
mainframes and dumb terminals that network operators envisioned in 
 
 210. See id. at 298–99 n.2 (discussing the effect of the consent decree on AT&T). 
 211. Id. at 302–04. 
 212. See GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 730–32 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussing GTE’s 
various challenges to the regulations). 
 213. See id. at 733–37. Although GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973), 
limited the FCC’s authority to impose specific restrictions on unregulated data processing 
activities, it confirmed the FCC’s jurisdiction to address data processing services that threatened 
to undermine its regulatory scheme for common carriers. See Werbach, supra note 48, at 555–57 
(addressing regulatory concerns relating to the Internet). 
 214. See Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1, 61 (1999) (“It is 
reasonable to believe that, had it been positioned to do so, the Bell System would have been 
vigorous in its effort to curtail, delay, or defeat the challenge posed by personal computers and, 
to some extent, its effort would have included the development and implementation of network 
software and products designed to match or surpass what was available on personal 
computers.”). 
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the 1960s.215 The modern PC and Internet markets developed as a 
direct result of the FCC’s actions in Computer I.216 
The competitive dynamics in the communications and computing 
industries since the 1960s, however, should not obscure the 
realization that animated the FCC’s inquiry: the two fields are 
inextricably interconnected. Bernard Strassburg, who at the time of 
Computer I served as chief of the FCC Common Carrier Bureau, 
described the FCC’s role in the proceeding as similar to that of a 
“marriage counselor.”217 Much as a married couple’s relationship 
evolves over time, dividing lines for computing and communication 
need to be reevaluated as market conditions change. The FCC 
revised the distinction between regulated and unregulated services in 
Computer II.218 But it has not returned squarely to the fundamental 
question of when “data processing . . . should be subject to the 
provisions of the Communications Act.”219 
Moreover, the question of data processing regulation was, and is, 
not limited to whether such services are best treated as regulated 
common carrier offerings. In Computer I, the FCC also considered 
two other dimensions: service requirements for the communications 
inputs to unaffiliated data processing providers and data privacy.220 
The FCC found it unnecessary to resolve these questions in Computer 
 
 215. A dumb terminal refers to an end-user computer that draws on a more powerful 
computer elsewhere on the network for its information, rather than performing significant 
processing itself. 
 216. See Bickerstaff, supra note 214, at 60–61 (discussing “the impact of Computer I on the 
commercial success of personal computers and the advent of services that has accompanied that 
success”). 
 217. Bernard Strassburg, Competition and Monopoly in the Computer and Data 
Transmission Industries, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 991, 991 (1968). 
 218. See Robert Cannon, Where Internet Service Providers and Telephone Companies 
Compete: A Guide to the Computer Inquiries, Enhanced Service Providers and Information 
Service Providers, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 49, 56 (2001) (“Basic telecommunication falls 
under Title II of the Communications Act and is subject to common carrier regulation and 
obligations. Enhanced services, in contrast, . . . are ‘unregulated’ by the Commission.”). 
 219. Computer I NOI, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, 15–16 (1966). The debate over the FCC’s jurisdiction 
over broadband Internet access addresses essentially the same issue, but it is framed very 
differently. See Werbach, supra note 48, at 541–45 (describing the expansion of the Internet and 
corresponding regulations). Having defined a particular instantiation of data processing that 
involves telecommunications as an integrated information service, the FCC is now seeking ways 
to pull it back into the statutory framework. Broadband, however, is only a limited subset of the 
Internet. See supra Part I.A. 
 220. See Calvin Davison, Stephen L. Babcock & John D. Leshy, Computers and Federal 
Regulation, 21 ADMIN. L. REV. 287, 290–91 (1969) (describing the inquiry into each of these 
subjects). 
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I.221 The proceeding begun in 1968 continued for more than three 
decades and through three major waves of decisions, but 
communications inputs and privacy essentially dropped out of 
consideration. Facts on the ground have caught up with the issues the 
FCC raised in the 1968 Notice of Inquiry.222 
In subsequent stages of the Computer Inquiries, the FCC allowed 
regulated carriers to offer what it called “enhanced services,” subject 
first to structural separation, and then to nonstructural safeguards.223 
The Computer Inquiry regime survived the 1996 Act, but the FCC 
eventually decided that the restrictions were unnecessary in the new 
competitive deregulated marketplace.224 
D. The Internet Instead 
The Computer Inquiry outlasted the circumstances of its birth; 
the computer utility did not. The computer utility as a business 
concept died with the disruption of the commercial time-sharing 
industry in the recession of 1970–71.225 At the same time, researchers 
moved on from the well-understood techniques of remote time 
sharing to the novel challenge of internetworking. From a technical 
standpoint, the work on Project MAC and other time-sharing systems 
in the 1960s laid the groundwork for the ARPANet in the 1970s, the 
NSFNet in the 1980s, and the commercial Internet in the 1990s and 
beyond. 
There was, however, an important shift from computer utility 
systems to the direct precursors of the Internet. The time-sharing 
systems were fundamentally centralized. The computer utility in its 
original form was a way to give many users access to one machine 
through a distributed collection of dumb terminals. The Internet is a 
 
 221. See Note, supra note 194, at 172–73 (“In 1966, the Federal Communications 
Commission launched the Computer Inquiry to explore the broad range of regulatory and policy 
problems generated by this technological development.”). 
 222. See infra Part III.B. 
 223. See Cannon, supra note 218, at 56–57 (describing the steps to becoming an enhanced 
services provider under Computer I and Computer II). 
 224. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,875 (2005) (report and order and notice of proposed 
rulemaking) (“We decline to continue to impose any Computer Inquiry requirements on 
facilities-based carriers in their provision of wireline broadband Internet access service.”). 
 225. See Martin Campbell-Kelly & Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz, Economic Perspectives on the 
History of the Computer Time-Sharing Industry, 1965–1985, 30 IEEE ANNALS HIST. 
COMPUTING 16, 16 (2008) (“The [computer utility] rhetoric was remarkably like that of the 
Internet’s early years, except that the predictions never came to pass.”). 
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far more distributed system, built not around the mainframe but 
around the minicomputer and the PC.226 The Internet as it actually 
evolved is a mechanism for linking together these computers and 
their networks into a seamless virtual system.227 The endpoints of the 
Internet are computers capable of engaging in their own processing 
and storage, and the “center” of the Internet does not exist because 
the Internet protocols link many fully autonomous networks in a flat 
topology.228 
The standard history of the Internet emphasizes the role of 
idealistic, iconoclastic engineers in developing the network outside of 
the regulated communications industry.229 The computer utility 
community in the 1960s, in contrast, was in the mainstream of 
academic research and corporate R&D.230 Ironically, the vision of 
communications and computing in the countercultural 1960s was a 
centralized model controlled by the incumbents, whereas the Internet 
that actually developed in the 1970s was a decentralized, distributed 
system. The computer utility community failed to appreciate that a 
system of the scale and scope they imagined could develop from the 
bottom up through open standards and entrepreneurial creativity. On 
the other hand, the engineers who built the Internet failed to 
appreciate that their creation could not indefinitely operate outside of 
the regulated communications infrastructure but would incorporate it. 
The success of the Internet demonstrates the value of open 
platforms.231 As the visionaries of the computer utility recognized, 
 
 226. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 36, at 1089 (joking that the founders of Apple Computer 
apparently failed to read the FCC’s pronouncement about centralized computer utilities). 
 227. See Werbach, supra note 83, at 1250–57 (“Though widely described as one network, the 
internet is actually a collection of several thousand independent networks, whose common 
characteristic is an agreement to interconnect to deliver internet protocol (IP) datagrams.”). 
 228. See Werbach, supra note 25, at 348 (noting that the Internet is composed of 
heterogeneous parts of layered and differing functionality). 
 229. See generally JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET (1999) (noting that, to some, 
“the system seemed at times to verge on anarchy,” without centralized direction); KATIE 
HAFNER, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1996) 
(describing the Internet as a product of the efforts of both the Department of Defense and a 
number of individuals unaffiliated with the government); McDonald, supra note 154, at 4 
(describing a libertarian conception of the Internet in which, “[r]ather than being driven by the 
initiative of governments and large corporations, new services would emerged [sic] from the 
individual initiative of widely distributed users”). 
 230. See McDonald, supra note 154, at 2–3 (noting that the computer utility industry was 
established and relatively mainstream in the 1960s). 
 231. See Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1975–76 
(2006) (noting that the Internet allows any computer or other information processor to become 
a part of the network easily, providing millions with access to information). 
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however, there are other important public policy issues to address. 
The Internet protocol architecture deliberately excluded specialized 
features for security and end-to-end reliability.232 The engineers who 
designed the Internet decided that the costs of fossilizing those 
mechanisms into the core protocols would exceed the benefits, 
especially as the network evolved.233 Indeed, this end-to-end approach 
has been a major factor in the Internet’s success.234 But this fact does 
not mean that concerns such as privacy and robustness are 
unimportant, especially because the Internet has reached a mass 
market level of adoption. The computer utility community posited 
these topics as important from the outset. 
The story of the Internet as a purely private creation has always 
left a great deal out. The predecessor network that demonstrated 
workable packet switching and internetworking, ARPANet, was 
primarily funded by an arm of the Department of Defense.235 The 
civilian network that later superseded it, NSFNet, was also federally 
funded and overseen. When the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
transitioned away from public funding and management of core 
Internet infrastructure in the early 1990s, it imposed transitional 
requirements, such as universal backbone interconnection through 
network access points (NAPs).236 Even as these early interventions 
faded, their effects in shaping both the technical and business 
practices of the Internet community have endured. 
 
 232. See BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 90–103 
(2010) (describing decisions made by the engineers designing the Internet not to implement the 
most reliable features after weighing them against other considerations). 
 233. See id. at 93 (noting that the “costs of providing error control in the application 
outweigh the benefits of doing so” for most applications). 
 234. See id. at 101 (“Providing a connectionless, unreliable datagram service at the Internet 
layer, while placing connection-oriented functionality in transport-layer protocols operating 
end-to-end between end hosts, makes the Internet more robust.”). 
 235. See ABBATE, supra note 229, at 43 (noting that ARPANet’s source of funding was the 
Department of Defense’s computing wing, ARPA). 
 236. See Brett M. Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet 
Infrastructure: Rethinking Market Intervention into Government and Government Intervention 
into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2001) (noting that the NSF and the 
NSFNet “community” created a new architecture for managing interconnection services); Jay P. 
Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You—Fool Us Twice Shame on Us: What We 
Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain Name 
System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 115–17 (2001) (noting that the privatization of NSFNet meant 
that regional networks would have to choose a commercial backbone, rather than rely on a 
central backbone, as they had before the NSF’s changes). 
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A renewed look at Computer I provides a deeper understanding 
of how regulatory decisions shaped the Internet. Computer I adopted 
a quarantine strategy for data processing services. These services 
were walled off from regulation, whereas the regulated carriers were 
either disallowed from providing them entirely, as AT&T was, or 
were subject to extensive structural restrictions, like the independent 
carriers were. The limitations of this approach became apparent 
quickly.237 The FCC thought it could establish a dividing line between 
communications and data processing services by considering hybrid 
offerings on a case-by-case basis.238 It was wrong. The exception 
swallowed the rule because the distinction between computing and 
communications became increasingly arbitrary as the communications 
network became increasingly digital.239 Nonetheless, Computer I 
remained on the books for close to a decade, until the FCC refined 
the dividing line in its 1980 Computer II proceeding.240 
The FCC’s quarantine approach in Computer I allowed it to 
avoid confronting the hard questions that the computer utility 
visionaries raised back in the 1960s. The emerging data processing 
firms such as Bunker Ramo were less concerned about avoiding 
regulatory oversight than about using the power of the FCC to 
modulate their relationships with powerful common carriers. As 
unregulated users of the network, they were guaranteed access, but 
they were limited to the service offerings the carriers developed. And 
the public policy considerations the computer utilities themselves 
raised had no place in a discussion purely focused on regulatory 
boundaries. 
The FCC’s regulatory structure has evolved to some degree, but 
it has largely maintained the quarantine model first adopted in 
Computer I. The Internet, however, is evolving much faster. Cloud 
computing, one of the most significant developments in the Internet 
industry, is recreating the computer utility. And as a result, the 
regulatory concerns of the earlier debate have become relevant once 
again. 
 
 237. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 238. See Computer I Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 276 (1971) (noting that the FCC would 
evaluate the character of particular services on an ad hoc basis). 
 239. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 36, at 1090–91 (noting that the FCC “declined even to 
give illustrative examples to help map out the definitional territory”). 
 240. See Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 423–28 (1980) (final decision) (recognizing that “a 
need exists to re-examine the definitional scheme established in the First Computer Inquiry in 
order to provide greater market certainty”). 
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III.  UTILITY REDUX: TO THE CLOUD! 
Every era generates new business forms in response to the 
shifting costs of transportation and communications.241 Such economic 
innovation sparks legal innovations to cabin potential abuses. Just as 
copyright arose in response to the power of the English stationers’ 
guild in the 1700s, public utility regulation was a response to railroads 
and telegraph operators in the 1900s. Something similar may be on 
the horizon at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The convergence 
of computing and communications is producing a phenomenon 
known as “cloud computing.” Cloud computing is the foundation for 
a new class of “network utilities,” which are in many ways the 
realization of the computer utility vision of the 1960s. These network 
utilities raise public policy questions similar to those considered in 
Computer I. The FCC should develop a new regulatory agenda that 
addresses both the ways cloud service providers depend on 
communications utilities and the ways they function as public utilities 
themselves. 
A. The Rise of Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing is an approach that places application 
processing and storage in network-based data centers, rather than in 
end-user devices such as personal computers.242 There are many 
potential applications for this technology. For example, instead of 
running local email applications and downloading mail from an ISP to 
their own hard drives, users can access email through Google’s Gmail, 
a web-based service that stores messages on Google’s own Internet-
 
 241. See generally THOMAS W. MALONE, THE FUTURE OF WORK (2004) (tracing the 
evolution of business in response to falling communications costs). 
 242. ROBERT GELLMAN, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, PRIVACY IN THE CLOUDS: RISKS TO 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY FROM CLOUD COMPUTING 4 (2009) (“[C]loud computing 
involves the sharing or storage by users of their own information on remote servers owned or 
operated by others and accessed through the Internet or other connections.” (emphasis 
omitted)); Peter Mell & Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, Version 15, 
NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud/upload/cloud-
def-v15.pdf (“Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access 
to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction.”); What Policymakers Should Know About 
“Cloud Computing,” GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 20, 2009, 10:35 AM ET), http://
googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/03/what-policymakers-should-know-about.html (defining 
cloud computing as “the movement of computer applications and data storage from the desktop 
to remote servers”). 
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based servers.243 Instead of running a sales force automation package 
locally, a salesperson can log into Salesforce.com and access contact 
and sales pipeline information over the Internet.244 And a startup such 
as Smugmug, which hosts photos for over 150,000 paying customers, 
can move from its own server array to Amazon.com’s cloud 
infrastructure, saving $500,000 in storage costs and providing flexible 
capacity for growth.245 In addition, major online services such as 
Google and Facebook are growing into full-fledged platforms built on 
top of huge reconfigurable pools of computing capacity. These 
platforms can integrate services on a common data layer and glean 
insights from user behavior across the system. They can also host 
third-party applications, such as the thousands built on top of 
Facebook. 
There are many definitions of cloud computing,246 but there is 
widespread agreement that the rise of cloud computing is producing 
significant business, network infrastructure, and public policy 
changes.247 Analysts predict huge growth in cloud computing.248 A 
 
 243. As of February 2010, Google had approximately 170 million Gmail users worldwide. 
Google Takes on Facebook and Twitter with Network Site, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/8506148.stm (last updated Feb. 9, 2010, 7:56 PM GMT). 
 244. As of January 2011, Salesforce.com manages data for over 92,300 corporate customers. 
Press Release, Salesforce.com, Salesforce.com Unveils Service Cloud 3, the Next Generation of 
Social Contact Centers (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.salesforce.com/company/news-
press/press-releases/2011/03/110303.jsp. 
 245. AWS Case Study: SmugMug, AMAZON WEB SERVS. (2006), http://aws.amazon.com/
solutions/case-studies/smugmug. 
 246. Cloud Computing: Clash of the Clouds, ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 2009, at 80, 80–82. 
 247. See CARR, supra note 158, at 117 (noting that cloud computing and similar technology 
will displace current business practices); Let It Rise, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL REP.), Oct. 25, 2008, 
at 3, 3 (noting that cloud computing “will allow digital technology to penetrate every nook and 
cranny of the economy and of society, creating some tricky political problems along the way”); 
Steve Lohr, I.B.M. to Push ‘Cloud Computing,’ Using Data from Afar, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2007, at C7 (noting that IBM is investing a large, undisclosed amount in its cloud technology); 
Daniel Lyons, Today’s Forecast: Cloudy, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 2008, at 24, 24 (noting that “tech 
giants” are “racing to deliver cloud products”); see also John Ciancutti, Four Reasons We 
Choose Amazon’s Cloud as Our Computing Platform, THE NETFLIX TECH BLOG (Dec. 14, 
2010, 9:35 AM), http://techblog.netflix.com/2010/12/four-reasons-we-choose-amazons-cloud-
as.html (explaining the business benefits that a leading online video distribution company found 
in using a third-party cloud platform). 
 248. See Geoffrey A. Fowler & Ben Worthen, The Internet Industry Is on a Cloud—
Whatever That May Mean, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at A1 (citing research firms predicting 
annual cloud computing revenues between $42 billion and $160 billion in 2011–12). 
  The growth of cloud computing does not mean that all Internet-based services will 
necessarily be centralized. The Internet is still an any-to-any network with no center. See VAN 
SCHEWICK, supra note 232, at 383–87 (describing the shift away from the end-to-end 
architecture of the original Internet); Werbach, supra note 25, at 351–53 (explaining how the 
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substantial majority of Americans already use services such as 
webmail, online data storage, and web-based productivity 
applications that are considered cloud computing.249 Most experts 
participating in a 2010 Pew Foundation Future of the Internet Survey 
expected that within a decade, remote servers would be the primary 
means of accessing applications and sharing information, rather than 
local applications.250 As John Hagel and John Seely Brown of 
Deloitte’s Center for the Edge stated, “Cloud computing has the 
potential to generate a series of disruptions that will ripple out from 
the tech industry and ultimately transform many industries around 
the world.”251 
In the late 1990s, many websites resided on a single server 
computer. Even very popular sites might have had only a handful of 
servers fed by load-balancing software at a single location. In 2011, 
the leading Internet companies build massive, multibillion dollar data 
centers the size of several football fields, each housing thousands of 
networked computers.252 A major service provider such as Google has 
as many web-connected servers as the total number of machines that 
were connected to the Internet in 1995, all linked into a colossal 
virtual supercomputer.253 And Google is at the leading edge of a huge 
 
Internet is “a network at war with itself” between centralizing and decentralizing forces). There 
are countervailing trends toward distributed peer production at the same time as other services 
are shifting to centralized cloud computing. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF 
NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 384 (2006) 
(identifying countervailing forces at the physical, logical, and content layers). 
 249. See John B. Horrigan, Cloud Computing Gains in Currency: Online Americans 
Increasingly Access Data and Applications Stored in Cyberspace, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 
12, 2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/948/cloud-computing-gains-in-currency (“Some 69% of 
online Americans use webmail services, store data online, or use software programs such as 
word processing applications whose functionality is located on the web.”); see also Christopher 
Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web 
2.0 Era, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 363 (2010) (“This computing model has 
become firmly ingrained in the consciousness of consumers . . . .”). 
 250. Janna Quitney Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Cloud Computing, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (June 11, 2010), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1623/future-cloud-computing-
technology-experts. 
 251. John Hagel III & John Seely Brown, Cloud Computing’s Stormy Future, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Sept. 14, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/bigshift/2010/09/cloud-computings-stormy-
future.html. 
 252. See CARR, supra note 158, at 65 (noting that Google has established “server farms” at 
covert locations around the world). 
 253. See Brian Barrett, Google’s Insane Number of Servers Visualized, GIZMODO (Apr. 14, 
2010, 5:20 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5517041/googles-insane-number-of-servers-visualized 
(noting that, with more than one million servers, “[i]t is speculated that Google owns more than 
2% of all the world’s servers”). By comparison, in January 1995, the Internet had approximately 
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trend.254 Smaller providers such as Twitter are building their own data 
centers, whereas others are tapping into public clouds offered by 
companies such as Amazon.com.255 All of the major online service 
providers, as well as enterprises with their own existing data center 
infrastructure, are all potential or actual cloud computing providers.256 
The rise of smart, connected mobile devices further feeds and 
builds on the move toward cloud approaches. Due to their small size, 
mobile phones do not have the same storage capacity as personal 
computers. Even when used for services such as email or document 
review, they are almost never a user’s sole computing device. Rather, 
they provide a mobile window into the user’s data. As a result of 
these two factors, virtually any application involving significant 
amounts of user data on a mobile device will incorporate remote 
storage and a cloud computing architecture. This is equally true for 
mobile access to a consumer service, such as iTunes for music or Yelp 
for local restaurant information, as it is for business applications such 
as Salesforce.com or Google Docs.257 
 
five million host addresses and an estimated one million machines actually connected and 
responding. Internet Growth: Raw Data, MIT, http://www.mit.edu/people/mkgray/net/internet-
growth-raw-data.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). 
 254. See Gilder, supra note 175, at 202 (“The data centers these companies are building 
began as exercises in making the planet’s ever-growing data pile searchable. Now, turbocharged 
with billions in Madison Avenue mad money for targeted advertisements, they’re morphing into 
general-purpose computing platforms, vastly more powerful than any built before.”). 
 255. Where the Cloud Meets the Ground, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL REP.), Oct. 25, 2008, at 6, 6–
7. 
 256. See MICHAEL ARMBRUST, ARMANDO FOX, REAN GRIFFITH, ANTHONY D. JOSEPH, 
RANDY H. KATZ, ANDREW KONWINSKI, GUNHO LEE, DAVID A. PATTERSON, ARIEL RABKIN, 
ION STOICA & MATEI ZAHARIA, ABOVE THE CLOUDS: A BERKELEY VIEW OF CLOUD 
COMPUTING 1 (2009) (distinguishing public and private clouds); JOHN HAGEL & JOHN SEELY 
BROWN, DELOITTE CTR. FOR THE EDGE, CLOUD COMPUTING—STORMS ON THE HORIZON 5 
(2010), available at http://www.johnseelybrown.com/cloudcomputingdisruption.pdf (describing 
the evolution of cloud computing providers); Mell & Grance, supra note 242 (“The cloud 
computing industry represents a large ecosystem of many models, vendors, and market 
niches.”). 
 257. See Steven Cherry, Forecast for Cloud Computing: Up, Up, and Away, 46 IEEE 
SPECTRUM 68, 68 (2009) (noting that a large portion of the recent increases in cell phone data 
transmission and reception is due to cloud computing); Mobile Will Be Key to Unlock Cloud 
Potential, MUSIC WK., July 17, 2010, at 9 (“The migration of music services into the cloud is 
essential for the music business because of the growing importance of devices such as 
smartphones that decentralise access for consumers.”). 
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B. Clouds as Utilities 
1. The New Computer Utilities.  Cloud computing bears a striking 
resemblance to the computer utility vision of the 1960s.258 Like 
computer utilities, cloud data centers leverage economies of scale 
from large quantities of centrally hosted computing power. In both 
cases, the value proposition is that computing services delivered 
across the network from a remote location will be superior to the 
same services on a machine residing locally in a home or office. Both 
systems employ technical mechanisms—time sharing in the 1960s and 
virtualization in the 2000s—to make a single computer function like 
multiple independent machines. Such techiques allow many users to 
operate many different applications at the same time, without 
dedicating specific machines to anyone. Both the computer utility and 
cloud computing, in other words, create the illusion of a local, 
dedicated machine. Providers in both models could sell computing 
capacity on a usage basis, scaling up or down based on demand. And 
in both cases, platform service providers have substantial control over 
both services and the associated data and metadata. 
There are certainly differences between the 1960s time-sharing 
mainframes and the fungible pools of server blades operating in 
Internet-connected data centers. The most sophisticated computer 
utility systems, such as Project MAC, were vastly less powerful and 
flexible than cloud platforms. The computer utility was primarily a 
tool for scientific research and operational functions in companies, 
managed by trained programmers. It was not a consumer 
phenomenon like the Internet that supported entertainment, 
productivity applications, social networking, and countless other 
popular activities for ordinary individuals. And, importantly, the 
computer utility did not have the Internet. Computer utility service 
bureaus had to build their own private, proprietary data networks on 
top of communications circuits. There was no common data-
networking platform that all users and all service providers could 
utilize.259 Finally, it should not be overlooked that the reality of the 
 
 258. See Bickerstaff, supra note 214, at 85 (arguing that the computer utility vision 
reappeared in network computing, a precursor to cloud computing). 
 259. Perhaps the computer utility failed initially in the marketplace for this reason. The 
Internet had to develop as a connectivity platform before centralized service platforms could 
take off through cloud computing. 
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computer utility never matched the expansive visions of the 1960s,260 
whereas cloud computing generates billions of dollars of activity and 
is poised to grow even further.261 
Cloud computing changes the relationship of users to their 
applications and service providers to the network in a similar manner 
to the old computer utility vision. For public policy, the economic and 
social interactions that new technologies drive are what matters, not 
the internal mechanics of those technologies. The computer utility 
idea painted a picture for opinion leaders and policymakers of 
ubiquitous computational capacity deliverable to a far wider range of 
problems and users than was possible previously. For the FCC, it 
raised questions about control of data and access to communications 
resources that were both similar to and distinct from the telephone 
network analogues. 
Cloud computing similarly is changing the way people think 
about both computers and computer networks. End-user devices can 
be smaller and cheaper because they draw from network-based 
services. This shift opened the door for new devices such as Apple’s 
iPad, which was among the most successful consumer product 
introductions in history.262 And the Internet has changed from a way 
to push data from one point to another into an oasis from which 
computing resources, applications, and personalized content can be 
pulled on demand when needed.263 As policymakers consider what 
cloud computing means, therefore, they can look back to the way 
their predecessors evaluated similar questions. 
The most fundamental analogy between the computer utility and 
cloud computing is that both are utilities in the classic sense. In the 
 
 260. See CARR, supra note 158, at 59 (describing how early predictions that computing 
would one day be organized as a public utility were held back by a lack of bandwidth). 
 261. See Steve Hilton, Cloud Computing Is No Fad, FORBES (July 12, 2010, 12:30 PM EDT), 
http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/12/cloud-computing-growth-entrepreneurs-technology-
informationweeksmb.html (stating that the global market for enterprise cloud-based services 
was $12.1 billion in 2010). 
 262. See Steve Monfort, Apple’s iPad a Runaway Sales Success, NASDAQ NEWS (Oct. 6, 
2010, 7:18 AM), http://community.nasdaq.com/News/2010-10/apples-ipad-a-runaway-sales-
success.aspx (“Apple’s (AAPL) iPad tablet is the hottest-selling electronic device ever, a new 
report from Bernstein Research shows.”). The iPad depends on a built-in wireless network 
connection to obtain applications and content. See The iPad: What You Need to Know, 
MACWORLD (Jan. 29, 2010, 6:05 PM), http://www.macworld.com/article/146020/2010/01/ipad_
faq.html (explaining the features of the iPad, including both Wi-Fi and 3G-enabled models). 
 263. See generally JOHN HAGEL III, JOHN SEELY BROWN & LANG DAVISON, THE POWER 
OF PULL (2010) (explaining the business impacts of the move toward a “pull” model, with cloud 
computing as one element supporting the shift). 
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case of the computer utility, the connection is inherent in the term 
itself. Proponents of the computer utility drew explicit parallels 
between large-scale remote time-sharing systems and traditional 
public utilities, such as electrical grids.264 Recognizing the limitations 
of the analogy, they nonetheless envisioned that computer processing 
would become nearly as important to society as power and water, and 
they expected it to be delivered in a similar fashion.265 Douglas 
Parkhill, author of the best-known book about the computer utility, 
describes the connection as follows: 
  The word “utility” in the term “computer utility” has, of course, 
the same connotation as it does in other more familiar fields such as 
in electrical power utilities or telephone utilities and merely denotes 
a service that is shared among many users, with each user bearing 
only a small fraction of the total cost of providing that service.266 
The same framing is being applied to cloud computing.267 Former 
Economist editor Nicholas Carr, in his 2008 book The Big Switch,268 
paints a detailed picture of cloud computing data centers as the 
equivalent of electrical power plants in their economic and business 
impacts.269 Carr points out that electricity was originally generated 
locally by individual factories operating water wheels or other 
mechanisms to serve their own needs.270 With the development of 
large generators, the electric light, and electrical distribution 
infrastructure, the economics shifted. It became far more efficient for 
 
 264. See Greenberger, supra note 1, at 64 (explaining the analogy between automatic 
computation and electricity, and the limitations of that analogy). 
 265. Even during the heyday of the computer utility concept, some authors argued that 
similarities to traditional regulated public utilities were overblown. See BARNETT, JR. ET AL., 
supra note 154, at 86–88 (“The conclusion is that present and foreseeable computer utilities are 
not structured like public utilities . . . .”). 
 266. PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 3. 
 267. The utility framing is also being applied to services built on top of cloud computing 
infrastructure. At a conference in early 2011, the CEO of the popular messaging service Twitter 
compared his company’s offering to a public water utility: “‘It needs to be water. It’s instantly 
useful. It’s simple. I don’t have to re-learn how to use water,’ he told the audience. ‘It’s always 
present.’” Pamela Parker, Twitter as Utility, Like Running Water? That’s Goal, Says CEO, 
SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Feb. 14, 2011, 10:12 PM ET), http://searchengineland.com/twitter-as-
utility-like-running-water-thats-goal-says-ceo-64803. 
 268. CARR, supra note 158. 
 269. Id. at 14–16. 
 270. Id. at 15–16. 
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large power plants to serve entire neighborhoods or cities than for 
customers to invest in their own electrical generation.271 
Cloud computing, Carr argues, represents a similar shift away 
from the decentralized model of the PC toward a power-plant 
structure.272 No individual can bring to bear the same resources as 
Google or Amazon.com. The financial investments, as well as the 
specialized expertise such companies develop, further widen the gap. 
Other systems start to be built around the centralized delivery of the 
core resource, a process accelerated through standardization.273 In the 
end, the central utility supplants the local generation model almost 
everywhere. Computing is not exactly analogous to electricity, which 
is completely undifferentiated and difficult to store. But the same 
factors that led to the centralization of energy distribution are turning 
networked computing into a service increasingly delivered by 
centralized utilities. 
2. Regulation in the Clouds.  The rise of computing as a utility, in 
the 1960s as well as in 2011, has significant regulatory implications. 
The proponents of the computer utility were never slow to 
acknowledge that their vision implied consideration of whether 
computing service bureaus should be subject to the same sort of 
public utility regulation as AT&T and other common carriers. Similar 
pressure is building in the Internet era. Early in 2010, for example, 
danah boyd, an influential sociologist at Microsoft Research, wrote a 
blog post titled, Facebook Is a Utility; Utilities Get Regulated.274 Her 
argument was that the drumbeat of privacy concerns about social 
networking services such as Facebook might most appropriately be 
addressed through government action. The argument provoked 
dozens of responses, most of which were fearful that government 
 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See id. at 14–16 (describing the additional systems built around centralized delivery of 
electricity and noting the importance of technical standards). 
 274. danah boyd, Facebook Is a Utility; Utilities Get Regulated, APOPHENIA (May 15, 2010), 
http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/05/15/facebook-is-a-utility-utilities-get-
regulated.html [hereinafter boyd, Facebook Is a Utility]; see also danah boyd, Facebook’s 
Privacy Trainwreck: Exposure, Invasion, and Social Convergence, 14 CONVERGENCE 13, 13–14 
(2008) (describing the concern generated by Facebook’s introduction of the News Feed 
feature). It is arguable whether Facebook is a cloud-computing platform. The definition of the 
term is somewhat loose, however, and Facebook is a huge network-based platform for remote 
storage, processing, and application hosting. See Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in 
Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 2–3 (2008) (describing the overlap 
between the shift to Web 2.0, which includes Facebook, and cloud computing). 
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regulation would crush Internet innovation.275 Indeed, governments 
around the world spent thirty years privatizing and liberalizing 
lumbering public utilities, and the Internet has been held up as a 
shining example of private enterprise. 
But boyd was on to something. Cloud computing platforms are 
utilities, in a very real sense. At the same time, they are competitive 
services that have thrived in the absence of communications 
regulation and depend on the public utility treatment of 
communications carriers for access to their customers. As the Internet 
increasingly becomes a distribution platform for centralized services, 
utility regulation should be the starting point for public policy 
discussions. 
Significant public policy questions have already arisen around 
cloud computing. For example, the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA)276 requires law enforcement actors to obtain a 
search warrant if they wish to access email stored on a user’s hard 
drive, but it applies a much lower standard when that same email has 
been stored for more than six months on Google’s Gmail servers, 
even though the user sees a parallel experience.277 When email was 
primarily something that users accessed locally—as it was in 1986, 
when ECPA was adopted—the statutory distinction may have made 
some sense. In 2011, when a huge and growing percentage of email is 
never copied onto a local hard drive, it no longer does. In December 
2010, the Sixth Circuit held that email stored remotely by ISPs and on 
cloud computing clusters is entitled to the same warrant requirements 
for government searches as locally stored messages under the Stored 
Communications Act provisions of ECPA.278 The issue seems likely to 
 
 275. boyd, Facebook Is a Utility, supra note 274. 
 276. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 277. See Soghoian, supra note 249, at 390–91 (explaining how the Fourth Amendment’s 
third-party doctrine offers little protection for users of electronic remote file storage services, 
given that the government can compel providers of such services to reveal their customers’ 
private documents with a subpoena); David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying 
Fourth Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 2205, 2215 (2009) (noting that the third-party doctrine is especially relevant in the cloud 
computing world, in which information is turned over to third-party cloud service providers with 
increasing frequency); William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing 
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1227 (2010) (describing how 
Congress relied extensively on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in drafting the ECPA’s 
privacy protections). 
 278. United States v. Warshak, Nos. 08-3997, 08-4085, 08-4087, 08-4212, 08-4429, 09-3176, 
2010 WL 5071766, at *14 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2010). 
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go before the Supreme Court, if Congress does not restructure ECPA 
first. 
Other impacts of cloud platforms are more subtle but, in the long 
run, more substantial. The cloud represents the full integration of 
computing and communications. Cloud platforms are simultaneously 
the network’s edge and its core; they thus pose a fundamental 
challenge to both the technical and legal assumptions about the 
Internet. Companies considering using cloud computing services for 
their data and applications must consider a variety of legal and policy 
considerations regarding the treatment of their data.279 On one level, 
cloud providers are simply online intermediaries, subject to 
contractual relationships with users and other service providers. From 
a broader perspective, though, the rise of cloud computing changes a 
default assumption that data will be within the control of the user. 
The 2010–11 controversy over Wikileaks, a website that 
anonymously disseminates leaked documents, put a further spotlight 
on cloud platforms.280 Wikileaks moved its content to the Amazon 
Web Services cloud-hosting platform when it faced denial-of-service 
attacks over its controversial distribution of thousands of leaked U.S. 
State Department diplomatic cables.281 Not long after, perhaps 
responding to pressure from U.S. government figures, Amazon.com 
dropped Wikileaks as a customer.282 Wikileaks itself may be a shady 
operation, but Amazon.com’s willingness to cut it off raised concerns 
that, in a cloud computing world, freedom of speech and corporate 
business continuity are at the whims of a network platform 
provider.283 As the federal agency concerned with promotion of 
innovation, economic activity, and democratic discourse through 
communications networks, the FCC cannot ignore this debate. 
Growing dependence on cloud computing platforms will thus 
make regulatory concerns about these platforms increasingly salient. 
 
 279. Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Cloud Computing Creates Legal Tangles, TECHWORLD 
(Aug. 3, 2010, 4:31 PM GMT), http://features.techworld.com/data-centre/3234162/cloud-
computing-creates-legal-tangles. 
 280. Ben Rooney, Amazon’s WikiLeaks Response Threatens Cloud Computing, WALL ST. J. 
TECH EUR. BLOG (Dec. 13, 2010, 10:26 AM GMT), http://blogs.wsj.com/tech-europe/2010/12/
13/amazons-wikileaks-response-threatens-cloud-computing. 
 281. Charlie Savage, Amazon Cites Terms of Use in Expulsion of WikiLeaks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 3, 2010, at A10. 
 282. See id. (describing Amazon.com’s reasoning). 
 283. See, e.g., Eugene Robinson, A Wiki Hornets’ Nest, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2010, at A23 
(“At stake are issues of free speech, censorship, privacy, sovereignty and corporate power.”). 
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As Carr points out, access to the electrical grid was initially a luxury 
for companies, but it quickly became essential.284 Something similar 
may well happen for many software applications delivered through 
cloud services. All of the major categories of end-user desktop 
software, from email to word processing to databases to games, are 
being provided on a large scale through cloud computing. Web 
search, a service that could be delivered no other way, is a dominant 
force in the Internet economy.285 Even the U.S. government is making 
a strong push to move federal IT systems to the cloud.286 When 
systems become so mission critical, regulators must address the public 
policy concerns they raise. The mechanisms will be less drastic than 
the government-ownership or common-carrier regulation applied to 
traditional public utilities, but cloud platforms should be subject to 
reasonable policies to promote the public interest. 
For at least three reasons, cloud computing is likely to produce 
the same kinds of dependencies that animated public utility 
regulation in other industries. First, there are significant economies of 
scale in delivering application functionality through large remote data 
centers. Service providers can operate, configure, and update a 
centrally managed collection of resources more efficiently than 
individual users responsible for their own personal computers.287 
Backup, business continuity, security, and other utility functions are 
 
 284. See CARR, supra note 158, at 43–44 (explaining how Chicago’s manufacturers were 
pressured to switch to centrally provided electricity due to its significant savings in costs, 
personnel, and management attention). 
 285. See, e.g., GOOGLE, GOOGLE’S ECONOMIC IMPACT: UNITED STATES 2009 (2010), 
available at http://www.google.com/economicimpact/pdf/google_economicimpact.pdf (“Google 
generated $54 billion of economic activity for American businesses, website publishers and non-
profits in 2009.”); see also HAMILTON CONSULTANTS, INC. WITH JOHN DEIGHTON & JACK 
QUELCH, ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE ADVERTISING-SUPPORTED INTERNET ECOSYSTEM 27 
(2009), available at http://www.iab.net/media/file/Economic-Value-Report.pdf (showing that 
web-search is a significant segment of Internet business and the fifth largest overall). 
 286. See Jessica Rettig, U.S. Government Takes a Step Toward Cloud Computing, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/12/06/us-
government-takes-a-step-toward-cloud-computing (describing a new White House–led effort to 
encourage federal agencies to choose cloud-computing options). 
 287. See Ian Foster, Carl Kesselman, Jeffrey M. Nick & Steven Tuecke, Grid Services for 
Distributed System Integration, COMPUTER, June 2002, at 37, 40 (“Unlike yesterday’s computing 
services companies, which tended to provide offline batch-oriented processes, today’s e-utilities 
often provide resources that both enterprise computing infrastructures and in-house and 
outsourced business processes use. Thus, one consequence of exploiting the economies of scale 
that e-utility structures enable is further decomposition and distribution of enterprise computing 
functions.”); see also Brian Hayes, Cloud Computing, COMM. ACM, July 2008, at 9, 11 
(describing the challenge of scalability in cloud computing). 
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significantly more efficient if deployed across a large virtualized cloud 
of computers. The cost is shared across all of the customers, and the 
cloud provider can develop expertise beyond that of individual 
companies. 
Second, because it allows many users to share large utility 
computing clusters, cloud computing is a better solution when 
demand fluctuates.288 Consider a startup launching a new web-based 
service. It has to ensure that it has enough processing and storage 
capacity to meet user demand. If the company must provision servers 
itself, there may be a substantial cost and delay to increase capacity if 
it underestimates demand. And if the company overestimates 
demand, it will spend unnecessary resources provisioning servers that 
it does not use. In one case, the service may crash, and in the other, 
the company wastes money. Neither is an attractive outcome. 
Moreover, demand forecasting is a constant exercise. What if the 
company runs a special promotion that causes a short-term spike in 
usage?289 Or what if it offers an enterprise service that is lightly used 
on the weekends? No individual company can match supply and 
demand as efficiently as a cloud-based aggregator of capacity. 
In a cloud-computing environment, on the other hand, 
companies share virtual capacity in massive clouds. The scale of the 
cloud platforms makes capacity a commodity for the provider, so 
overprovisioning does not create the same difficulties as it does for 
individual companies. The cloud provider can also deploy 
virtualization software and other technical mechanisms to more 
efficiently utilize its capacity.290 Aggregation of demand across 
different services with different requirements naturally tends to 
smooth out spikes. Especially in a fast-changing environment, the 
cloud approach therefore provides a more efficient and higher-
performing solution than companies could provide through local self-
provisioning. 
Third, cloud computing allows the service provider to capture 
and aggregate large volumes of user data. This information can help 
the service provider improve its service, or it can open up new 
 
 288. See Michael Armbrust, Armando Fox, Rean Griffith, Anthony D. Joseph, Randy Katz, 
Andy Konwinski, Gunho Lee, David Patterson, Ariel Rabkin, Ion Stoica & Matei Zaharia, A 
View of Cloud Computing, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2010, at 50, 52–53 (describing the importance of 
having adequate computing resources to handle demand fluctuations). 
 289. See id. 
 290. Mladen A. Vouk, Cloud Computing—Issues, Research and Implementations, 16 J. 
COMPUTING & INFO. TECH. 235, 237–38 (2008). 
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business opportunities. Gmail, which generates revenue through 
targeted advertisements, is a good example. Google does not need to 
charge for its email service, even though the gigabytes of storage it 
offers to users are not costless to provide. Instead, Google monetizes 
Gmail by algorithmically matching message text to targeted 
advertisements.291 Google can make this model work only because it 
can aggregate large numbers of ads and large volumes of email text in 
the same computing environment as its analytical software. 
3. The Deregulatory Dance.  The FCC has, to date, not taken 
interest in these developments the way it confronted the computer 
utility concept in the 1960s. There are several reasons it has not. The 
cloud computing market is still new and fast-changing. The market 
leaders, such as Amazon.com, Salesforce.com, Microsoft, and Google, 
are pure information technology firms, not communications 
carriers.292 Though some of them are now very large companies, no 
one player dominates the market, and none appears to control an 
essential competitive input.293 Barriers to entry are low, and new 
entrants such as Twitter can quickly grow into major forces. Rules 
 
 291. Jason Isaac Miller, Note, “Don’t Be Evil”: Gmail’s Relevant Text Advertisements 
Violate Google’s Own Motto and Your E-mail Privacy Rights, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1607, 1612–
14 (2005). 
 292. Telecommunications networks have traditionally been subject to government 
requirements to provide nondiscriminatory access. See Thomas B. Nachbar, The Public 
Network, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 67, 70 (2008) (describing nondiscriminatory access 
regimes). The rationale for doing so has never been definitely established. Professor Thomas 
Nachbar has examined three common arguments for the public network concept—necessity, 
holding out, and market power—and has found them all wanting. Id. at 79. Instead, he 
emphasizes the value of nondiscrimination rules to reduce transaction costs and promote 
standardization. Id. at 108–09. 
 293. The essential facilities doctrine in antitrust law gives the government the authority to 
impose remedies when a company exercises bottleneck control over an element that is essential 
for competitive entry. See Thomas F. Cotter, The Essential Facilities Doctrine, in ANTITRUST 
LAW & ECONOMICS 157, 157 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2010) (explaining that the essential facilities 
doctrine requires a monopolist to provide competitors with access to a facility if that access is 
essential for effective competition); J. Gregory Sidak & Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Essential 
Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1190–91 (1999) (explaining that the central principle of the 
essential facilities doctrine is that a monopolist must provide reasonable access to a facility 
essential to other competitors if it is feasible to do so). 
The doctrine suffered a serious blow from the Supreme Court in Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410–11 (2004). 
Some scholars have attempted to rehabilitate the doctrine, especially as applied to 
communications infrastructure and the Internet. See Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber 
Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 8 (2008) (“The best cases for the 
essential facilities model typically involve the denial of access to infrastructure and networks, 
particularly in the context of regulated industries in transition.”). 
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designed for the slow-moving, highly concentrated public-utility 
world seem a poor fit. The most significant reason, however, is the 
shift away from intrusive regulation of monopolies toward facilitation 
of competition as a central regulatory goal.294 
The period in which the FCC adopted Computer I represented 
the turning point toward this new approach to communications 
regulation. The FCC’s decision not to treat data processing as a 
communications service was based on its recognition of the limits of 
that regulatory box. As the FCC stated, 
Government intervention and regulation are limited to those areas 
where there is a natural monopoly, where economies of scale are of 
such magnitude as to dictate the need for a regulated monopoly, or 
where such other factors are present to require governmental 
intervention to protect the public interest because a potential for 
unfair practices exists.295 
None of these factors was true for the computer utilities in the 1960s, 
and none is true for modern cloud computing providers. Again, it was 
in Computer I that these two threads of skepticism of regulation and 
skepticism about its absence came together for the converging worlds 
of communications and computing. 
Computer I was never really a fight over whether the FCC would 
regulate independent data processing companies. Despite the broad 
framing of the proceeding, blanket regulation of data processing 
services was never actually on the table.296 No commenters seriously 
argued that all remote data processing should be considered a 
regulated common carrier offering.297 In its decision, the FCC quickly 
concluded that “the offering of data processing services is essentially 
competitive,” and that no regulation was needed when unregulated 
companies provided those services.298 It spent the bulk of its efforts 
setting out the justification and specific terms for regulation of 
common carriers in their interaction with the data processing market. 
 
 294. See supra Part II.A. 
 295. Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 297 (1970). 
 296. See Dunn, supra note 198, at 380 (calling this possibility “only hypothetical” and “not 
seriously considered by any of the respondents to the inquiry”). 
 297. Id. 
 298. Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 297. It offered a caveat: “[h]owever, if 
there should develop significant changes in the structure of the data processing industry, or, if 
abuses emerge which require the exercise of corrective action by the Commission, we shall not 
hesitate to re-examine the policies set forth herein.” Id. at 298. 
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The important decisions in Computer I involved not the 
unregulation of data processing services, but the regulation of the 
network operators on which they depended. The FCC recognized that 
computer utilities and other remote data processing services needed 
communications circuits to deliver their offerings to customers. And it 
recognized that carriers might fail to provide those circuits or to 
provide them in a discriminatory manner, especially if the carriers 
were themselves competitors in the data processing market. That, 
after all, was the lesson of the Bunker Ramo incident. As the FCC 
stated, “The dangers identified by respondents and by the SRI study 
relate primarily to the alleged ability of common carriers to favor 
their own data processing activities by discriminatory services, cross 
subsidization, improper pricing of common carrier services, and 
related anticompetitive practices and activities.”299 
Intriguingly, one of the arguments against regulation of 
computer utilities was that, if they were classified as carriers, the 
terms of their interconnection with other carriers would be outside 
the FCC’s jurisdiction.300 It was not until the FCC began the process of 
allowing MCI to interconnect with AT&T for competitive long-
distance service, and until the courts and Congress eventually 
changed their approach to internetwork interconnection, that such 
questions came within the FCC’s purview. In other words, the FCC’s 
refusal to regulate data processing services in Computer I was based 
on more than its stated desire to avoid unnecessary intrusion into a 
competitive market.301 The FCC had to keep data processing 
unregulated as a basis for regulating the essential inputs supporting 
that market. 
The FCC was not ignorant of the regulatory concerns that 
networked data processing services posed. Nor did it consider the 
computer utility outside of its jurisdictional authority. It made the 
justifiable decision that the potential harms of regulating a nascent, 
competitive industry exceeded the potential benefits of such 
regulation. Common carrier regulation at the time meant far more 
extensive government intrusion than even the most dominant 
incumbent network operators experience in 2011. And although 
 
 299. Id. at 301–02. 
 300. See Manley I. Irwin, Federal Regulations and Monopoly, in COMPUTERS AND 
COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 156, at 199, 206 (“The Federal Communications Commission 
generally regards carrier-to-carrier leasing arrangements as beyond its jurisdiction, and appeals 
to Congress for legislative authority to acquire this jurisdiction have so far been unsuccessful.”). 
 301. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
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experts such as Parkhill and Professor Fano described the significance 
of the computer utility in expansive terms,302 data processing service 
bureaus were a small, specialized industry at the time of Computer I, 
especially compared to the massive AT&T and other regulated 
communications carriers. There was no guarantee that the computer 
utility would reach its potential, and indeed, the centralized vision of 
the 1960s was never realized. 
The FCC’s decision to address the inputs to networked data 
processing services, rather than the policy considerations of those 
services, in Computer I should be understood within its historical 
context. It was not a conclusion that computer-based services should 
never be the subjects of communications policy. Nonetheless, 
dominant network operators are using the very categories the FCC 
crafted for data processing startups to escape from obligations 
designed to protect the innovative potential of those startups’ 
descendants. 
C. The Network Utility Agenda 
As William Shakespeare famously wrote, “What’s past is 
prologue.”303 Just as the FCC in 1968 had to balance regulation, 
deregulation, and unregulation in a fast-changing technological 
environment, the FCC in 2011 must confront the development of 
cloud computing platforms into network utilities. Just as the FCC in 
1968 faced market realities mismatched with the statutory language of 
its jurisdictional delegation, so too did the FCC in 2011. In the 
Computer I Tentative Decision, the FCC set the appropriate standard 
for resolving such conundrums: “we should look to the basic purpose 
of regulatory activity in the context of our general national policy, as 
well as the specific statutory guidelines given this agency.”304 The 
solution to the contemporary challenges of cloud computing likely 
requires some legislative reform in addition to FCC action. Either 
way, a clear sense of objectives will be important to frame the issues 
and avoid missteps. 
The FCC’s engagement with the Internet has focused 
increasingly on the end-user connection to the network, as well as on 
competition and investment in broadband access. The network 
 
 302. See supra notes 163–66, 264–66 and accompanying text. 
 303. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1, l. 247 (Yale Univ. Press 2006). 
 304. Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 297. 
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neutrality controversy epitomizes this emphasis.305 As important as 
those questions are, they represent only a limited subset of the issues 
that the FCC must address as the Internet and communications 
converge. The concerns about user protections and competition in the 
broadband-access market may well be temporary, because they hinge 
on limited competition. If the FCC is successful in promoting 
competition, the concerns about network neutrality abate. Network 
neutrality has thus been far less of a controversy in Europe, where 
open access policies have resulted in significantly more competition in 
broadband access.306 
In contrast, interactions within the network may not be 
amenable to a competitive solution. Recall the Comcast–Level 3 fight 
over charges to carry Netflix video traffic.307 Comcast had a 
terminating-access monopoly on the connection to its customers. No 
matter how many broadband access competitors there were, Level 3 
was still forced to use Comcast’s last-mile connection to reach 
customers who had chosen Comcast as their broadband access 
provider. If Comcast’s charges distorted the market and unreasonably 
restricted Level 3 or Netflix, competition cannot be the solution. Only 
 
 305. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 306. See Martin Cave & Pietro Crocioni, Does Europe Need Network Neutrality Rules?, 1 
INT’L J. COMM. 669, 669 (2007) (“[O]ne of the chief reasons for the lack of panic [over network 
neutrality] in Europe is the presence of a fairly robust and comprehensive regulatory 
framework . . . .”); Kenneth R. Carter, J. Scott Marcus, Adam J. Peake & Tomoaki Watanabe, 
A Comparison of Network Neutrality Approaches in: The U.S., Japan, and the European Union 
19–22 (July 28, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1658093 
(“The European communications market is a relatively competitive environment. . . . This 
success in competitive alternatives stems from a European emphasis on pro-competitive and 
explicitly technologically neutral regulation[, which] is at the heart of the EU 
approach. . . . There have been few calls for additional obligations assuring Network Neutrality 
in the market, and [there have been] no prominent cases of discriminatory behaviour against 
content operators.”); Neelie Kroes, Vice-President for the Digital Agenda, Eur. Comm’n, Net 
Neutrality—The Way Forward, Speech at the European Commission and European Parliament 
Summit on “The Open Internet and Net Neutrality in Europe” 2 (Nov. 11, 2010), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/643&format=PDF&age
d=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (“A healthy competitive environment allows tackling 
many potential problems at their root, avoiding the emergence of monopolistic gatekeepers 
which could create serious dangers for net neutrality. This is why the debate is different [in 
Europe] than in the United States.”). The level of concern about network neutrality in Europe 
does appear to have increased, however. See Council Directive 2009/140/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 
37, 69 (EC) (declaring that the European Commission “attaches high importance to preserving 
the open and neutral character of the Internet” and that it “will monitor closely the 
implementation of these provisions in the Member States, introducing a particular focus on how 
the ‘net freedoms’ of European citizens are being safeguarded”). 
 307. See supra Part I.B. 
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direct oversight of the network interconnection relationships can 
address the problem. This is a familiar situation in 
telecommunications regulation.308 Additionally, competition may hurt 
more than it helps with concerns such as privacy, if it produces a race 
to the bottom among providers. 
By focusing on competition and network neutrality, therefore, 
the FCC may be missing larger concerns. The FCC should broaden its 
focus to the evolving Internet platform, which is integrally connected 
to the communications networks over which it has oversight 
responsibilities. It should relax its sharp distinction between regulated 
and unregulated services and hone in on the major competitive, pro-
innovation, and consumer-protection issues for a network of cloud 
services fed by communications carriers. Although it is impossible to 
anticipate all of the issues that will arise, four major categories of 
concerns present themselves. All of them were present in the 
computer utility debates before and during Computer I. 
1. Connectivity.  The convergence of computing and 
communications means that networked data services are dependent 
on communications inputs. The first concern for cloud computing 
services, as it was for computer utilities in the 1960s, is the availability 
of nondiscriminatory access to networks. 
A carrier might block or discriminate against data processing 
services in the provision of network connectivity for several reasons.309 
It might simply wish to collect rents from upstream providers, a 
practice that Chicago School antitrust scholars generally consider 
 
 308. See Jean-Jacques Laffont, Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, Network Competition: I. 
Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing, 29 RAND J. ECON. 1, 2 (1998) (“Unconstrained 
interconnection negotiations raise two concerns. First, it is often suggested that during the 
transition toward competition, entrants may be handicapped by the incumbent’s reluctance to 
provide access to its network on a reciprocal basis and at a reasonable price. Second, some 
wonder whether, in the mature phase, established networks could not use their interconnection 
agreements to enforce collusive behavior.”); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a 
Unified Theory of Access to Local Telephone Networks, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 91–102 (2008) 
(“Interconnection access disrupts network management to a much greater degree than retail 
and wholesale access.”). See generally Glen O. Robinson & Dennis L. Weisman, Designing 
Competition Policy for Telecommunications, 7 REV. NETWORK ECON. 509 (2008) (describing the 
essential facilities doctrine and its dynamic relationship with network sharing). 
 309. See VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 232, at 218–73 (“[A] discriminatory network enables a 
network provider to engage in noncooperative strategic behavior.”). See generally Joseph 
Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a 
Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2003) 
(explaining why platform owners might overly restrict or discriminate against activities on their 
platforms, despite the strong incentives to the contrary). 
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acceptable.310 Alternatively, the carrier might see the data processing 
service as being in actual or potential competition with its own core 
activities. AT&T and Western Union made this argument in the 
Bunker Ramo incident.311 The argument against competition had far 
more force at that time because telephone service was a regulated 
monopoly. Companies such as AT&T bore special burdens in part 
because, at least in theory, the absence of competition allowed for 
necessary network investment and universal service. In 2011, carriers 
cannot claim the right to exclude competitors as part of a grand 
regulatory compact. Competition is the norm rather than the 
exception. Carriers that block or discriminate in this manner are 
simply protecting their turf against competitive incursion. The 
regulatory question is therefore whether such actions should be 
blocked as an improper exercise of market power. 
The carrier might participate in the data processing market itself. 
As both a supplier and a competitor, the carrier would have 
incentives to disadvantage an unaffiliated data processing service or 
to cross-subsidize its own competitive offerings.312 This was not an 
option for AT&T after Computer I. But it was the subject of much of 
the discussion in that proceeding, because other regulated common 
carriers also wished to offer computer utility services. The FCC in 
Computer I used a structural solution.313 It required common carriers 
 
 310. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
225–31 (1978) (“Vertical mergers are means of creating efficiency, not of injuring competition. 
There is a faint theoretical case . . . that vertical mergers can be used by very large firms for 
purposes of predation under exceptional circumstances, but it is highly doubtful that that 
narrow possibility has any application to reality.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 
223–29 (2d ed. 2001) (“Were vertical integration deemed a suspect practice . . . , all commercial 
activity would be placed under a cloud as the courts busied themselves redrawing the 
boundaries of firms, even though the normal motivation for and consequence of vertical 
integration are merely to reduce the transaction costs involved in coordinating production by 
means of contracts with other firms.”); RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, 
ANTITRUST 557–58 (2d ed. 1981). 
 311. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 312. The vertical leveraging theory has been the subject of substantial academic debate. See 
DANIEL F. SPULBER & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, NETWORKS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: 
ECONOMICS AND LAW 143–51 (2009) (critiquing the concept). 
 313. See Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 302 (1970) (“[W]e are hereby 
adopting a policy that communications common carriers shall furnish data processing services 
only through separate corporate entities.”). Interestingly, the FCC observed that the major 
interstate common carriers, such as GTE and Western Union, had already been voluntarily 
offering their data processing services through separate subsidiaries before Computer I was 
adopted. Id. at 304. AT&T was foreclosed at the time from offering unregulated services such as 
data processing. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
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that provided data processing services to use separate subsidiary 
companies, subject to “maximum separation,” to ensure fair arms-
length dealing with the parent.314 
Connectivity issues go beyond nondiscrimination.315 A further 
dimension concerns the free flow of data through the network. Paul 
Baran, who developed the packet-switching technology that underlies 
the Internet, recognized this problem early on. In a 1968 white paper 
expanding on an article in Public Interest magazine, he argued that 
“[a] new pronouncement by the regulatory agencies of a doctrine of 
free interchange of signals across the boundaries of individual systems 
would be of tremendous technological benefit.”316 Baran’s call for a 
“doctrine of free exchange of signals” sounds eerily like the “freedom 
to connect” that more recently became a mantra of both the noted 
network policy analyst David Isenberg317 and Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton.318 
The computer utilities of the 1960s were private, 
noninterconnected systems. The Internet, however, was designed 
primarily for the purpose of universal interconnectivity.319 A 
technologist such as Baran, who straddled both efforts, could see that 
the free flow of data was the ultimate technical and public policy 
objective. But the FCC in the Computer Inquiries was focused more 
 
 314. Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 298. These rules were modified in the 
1980 Computer II decision, replaced with nonstructural safeguards in the 1986 Computer III 
decision, and then effectively abandoned when the FCC classified broadband as an information 
service in 2002, Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other 
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rulemaking) 
(cable broadband); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019 (2002) (notice of proposed rulemaking) (DSL service). 
 315. See generally Werbach, supra note 83 (distinguishing between the concepts of 
interconnection and nondiscrimination). 
 316. Baran, supra note 154, at 3. 
 317. See F2C: FREEDOM TO CONNECT, http://freedom-to-connect.net (last visited Apr. 12, 
2011). 
 318. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom (Jan. 21, 2010), 
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm (transcribing an interview in 
which Secretary Clinton defined “the freedom to connect” as “the idea that governments should 
not prevent people from connecting to the internet, to websites, or to each other”); Mark 
Landler, Clinton Makes Case for Internet Freedom as a Plank of American Foreign Policy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A6 (“Her speech was the first in which a senior American official had 
articulated a vision for making Internet freedom a plank of American foreign policy.”). 
 319. See Werbach, supra note 83, at 1250 (“The internet was devised to bridge different 
networks . . . .”); Werbach, supra note 25, at 400–02 (“For those who created it, the Internet had 
one paramount objective: it was designed to transport packets of data transparently across a 
network of networks.”); supra Part II.D. 
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on the regulation of carriers providing traditional telephone services 
than on the development of the converged data processing market. 
Interconnectivity was something that would develop, if at all, through 
the functioning of the competitive market. The interconnectivity of 
the Internet, however, was heavily influenced in its early days by 
government involvement. And with the rise of cloud computing and 
massive data aggregation platforms, the potential for fragmentation is 
increasing.320 
2. Capacity and Robustness.  Connectivity was not the only issue 
before the FCC in Computer I. Nor is it the only important 
consideration in the interface between network operators and 
Internet-based services in 2011. Even if network operators do not 
discriminate in their treatment of unaffiliated data processing 
services, they could either provide insufficient capacity to support 
those services or fail to offer the features and functions required. The 
lead author of the SRI report to the FCC in the Computer I 
proceeding stated that “[p]erhaps the most critical issue presented by 
the computer inquiry is whether or not the telephone carriers are 
going to be capable of meeting the rapidly growing demand for low-
cost data communications.”321 Such concerns are especially significant 
in light of the rapid growth of the unregulated markets. Insufficient 
network capacity could be a crippling blow to digital services looking 
to cope with rapid scaling. 
The FCC’s Computer I Final Decision and its subsequent 
decisions did not impose any requirements on regulated carriers to 
offer sufficient capacity and functionality.322 The FCC in its Computer 
 
 320. See Werbach, supra note 25, at 353–83 (“From the physical infrastructure that delivers 
data across the globe to the content-based services that drive advertising and transactions, the 
Internet is becoming a less uniform, less universal place.”). 
 321. Dunn, supra note 198, at 371. 
 322. The FCC later established the Open Network Architecture (ONA) process under 
Computer III to encourage carriers and enhanced service providers to negotiate such 
arrangements, but it was a failure. See Werbach, supra note 19, at 22–26 (describing how ONA 
“proved contentious in practice” and was ultimately vacated by the Ninth Circuit in 1994). 
  The FCC’s decision not to impose service requirements on carriers to support data-
networking services parallels the NSF’s decision not to impose performance standards on the 
Internet’s network access points when privatizing the NSFNet backbone. See Management of 
NSFNET: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sci. of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech., 102d 
Cong. 80 (1992) (statement of Mitchell Kapor, President, Elec. Frontier Found., Chairman, 
Commercial Internet Exch.) (“As the Internet was growing, the NSF wisely instituted an AUP 
that allowed for a wide variety of uses of the network, including some that could strictly be 
WERBACH IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 4/14/2011  6:24:49 PM 
1832 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1761 
I Tentative Decision stated that “the adequacy of present tariff 
offerings of common carriers, and particularly the question of 
interconnection, was the subject of considerable comment from many 
computer respondents.”323 Nonetheless, it essentially punted on 
interconnection terms. The FCC committed to review tariff offerings 
and to investigate concerns that data processing services were not 
receiving sufficient capacity or needed functionality.324 It also noted 
that two unrelated proceedings were causing changes in carrier tariffs 
that would benefit the computer industry. In the Carterfone325 
proceeding, the FCC forced AT&T to allow users to connect any 
devices they wished to the network.326 Around the same time, the 
FCC began to require AT&T to interconnect its lines with MCI, then 
a private microwave service operating in the Midwest.327 This decision 
liberalized carrier interconnection tariffs, which could have meant 
more flexibility in dealing with other systems, such as computer 
utilities. 
Considerations of capacity and robustness will be increasingly 
important for the environment of cloud computing. Cloud providers 
lack the industrial-strength equipment and long-standing commitment 
to “five nines” reliability that are hallmarks of telephone network 
operators.328 The Internet developed with a best-efforts culture, which 
allowed for the cost savings and flexibility that contributed to its 
success. As cloud computing platforms become the foundation for 
major business activities, however, reliability becomes increasingly 
important. Outages of major network platforms such as Gmail can 
inconvenience millions of users and interrupt significant business 
 
classified as ‘commercial.’ This open policy encouraged extensive use of the Internet and made 
it a success.”). 
 323. Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 292 (1970). 
 324. See id. at 292–93 (highlighting “[f]ormal hearings” and “[i]nformal conferences” in 
progress and a study commissioned by the National Academy of Sciences). 
 325. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 
(1968). 
 326. Id. at 423–24 (“[W]e . . . conclude that the tariff [barring the Carterfone] has been 
unreasonable, discriminatory, and unlawful in the past, and that the provisions prohibiting the 
use of customer-provided interconnecting devices should accordingly be striken [sic].”); see 
Werbach, supra note 19, at 18–19 (“The FCC not only rejected the application of the Bell tariffs 
to bar use of the Carterfone; it struck down all foreign attachment restrictions in those tariffs as 
contrary to the public interest.”). 
 327. MCI eventually grew into the competitor with AT&T that forced the breakup. 
 328. “Five nines” refers to 99.999 percent uptime. 
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activities.329 Twitter was so unreliable during its period of rapid 
growth that it became known for the “fail whale” graphic that 
appeared during its frequent outages.330 
In addition to these internal reliability and capacity issues, cloud 
providers depend on sufficient capacity from communications 
network operators. Virtualized server clusters may be easily scalable 
as demand increases, but network ports and circuits are not. The 
Comcast–Level 3 dispute arose, at least from Comcast’s perspective, 
for precisely this reason. Comcast claimed that Level 3 suddenly 
demanded additional ports into Comcast’s network and dramatically 
increased its outbound traffic flow when it signed Netflix as a 
customer.331 To Comcast, Level 3 was at fault for ramping up its 
capacity demands suddenly. To Level 3, Comcast was at fault for 
failing to provide the necessary capacity to bring Netflix’s traffic to 
Comcast’s subscribers. The FCC will need to consider what role to 
take in enhancing the reliability and robustness of increasingly 
mission-critical networked services that depend on communications 
networks. 
3. Data Integrity and Privacy.  The third category of issues 
concerns what the data-networking services do with data. “Privacy” 
does not do justice to the range of concerns about the informational 
practices of cloud providers; “information governance” might be a 
better term.332 
 
 329. On May 14, 2009, an error in Google’s traffic routing resulted in the unavailability of all 
Google services globally for two hours, which marked a fifteen-fold drop in global Internet 
traffic. Ryan Singel, Google Fails Around the World Thursday Morning, WIRED EPICENTER 
(May 14, 2009, 12:40 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/05/google-fails-around-the-
world; Ryan Singel, When Google Goes Down, It Falls Hard, WIRED EPICENTER (May 14, 2009, 
5:13 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/05/when-google-goes-down-it-goes-down-hard. 
For a continuously updated collection of cloud services failures, see CLOUDFAIL.NET, http://
cloudfail.net (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). 
 330. Rob Walker, A Successful Failure, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 15, 2009, at 17, 17. 
 331. See Letter from Lynn Charytan, Vice President of Legal Regulatory Affairs, Comcast 
Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC 3 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/
ecfs/document/view?id=7020924384 (“Level 3 contends that it is perfectly fair to shift all the 
going-forward costs of sustaining exploding Internet growth onto one network in a two-network 
arrangement.”). 
 332. See David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, Governing Networks, 27 BROOK. J. 
INT’L. L. 819, 838–40 (2002) (“The informational, coordinative and competitive modes of policy 
interdependence each pose governance challenges in decentralized regulatory systems.”); 
Michael J. Madison, Information Governance, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 673, 
676 (2009) (arguing that the notion of information governance includes “material, conceptual 
and social” influences). 
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Discussions about the computer utility in the 1960s frequently 
raised concerns about personal data.333 As one 1967 monograph 
stated, “Personally, the thought of a system that will record and store 
information on what I purchased for how much at what time and place 
everytime I purchase so much as a newspaper or candy bar frightens 
me.”334 Numerous scholars and other experts identified privacy as an 
independent rationale that might justify government regulation of 
computer utilities.335 There were also concerns about security and data 
integrity. If a user’s data were stored in a remote computer utility, 
what assurance did the user have that the data would be maintained 
properly?336 
Many similarities between such worries and contemporary 
concerns about cloud service providers exist.337 Aggregation of vast 
stores of data is one of the hallmarks of modern Internet leaders, such 
 
 333. See PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 149 (“How, then, in the day of the computer utility 
are we to protect a citizen’s private files from surreptitious examination by overzealous public 
officials?”). 
 334. Paul Armer, Social Implications of the Computer Utility 6 (RAND Paper Series, Paper 
No. P-3642, 1967). 
 335. ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 210 (1971); Jeffrey Meldman, 
Centralized Information Systems and the Legal Right to Privacy, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 335, 335–36 
(1968); Arthur R. Miller, Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview, 4 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 11 (1972); see also Edward J. Grenier, Jr., Computers and 
Privacy: A Proposal for Self-Regulation, 1970 DUKE L.J. 495, 496–97 (proposing a self-
regulatory alternative to federal privacy regulation for the computer industry). See generally 
The Computer and Invasion of Privacy: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Invasion of 
Privacy of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 89th Cong. 2 (1966) (statement of Rep. Cornelius 
E. Gallagher, Chairman, Special Subcomm. on Invasion of Privacy of the H. Comm. on Gov’t 
Operations) (“What we seek at this point is to create a climate of concern, in the hope that 
guidelines can be set up which will protect the confidentiality of reports and prevent invasion of 
individual privacy . . . .”); ANNETTE HARRISON, THE PROBLEM OF PRIVACY IN THE COMPUTER 
AGE: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1967) (providing an annotated listing of over three 
hundred publications relating to the problem of privacy and computers). 
 336. Security and integrity concerns back in the computer utility era bear substantial 
similarities to today’s cloud computing environment. See, e.g., BARNETT, JR. ET AL., supra note 
154, at 83–84 (“[P]erhaps the problem of most concern to a potential utility user is the security 
of his data base held in the memory units of [the] utility system. Although this problem has been 
solved conceptually, the solutions have not always enjoyed complete success in 
implementation.”); see also Armer, supra note 334, at 13–14 (“Unauthorized access and copying 
are more difficult matters, requiring much more work and inventiveness. . . . Computer-utility 
personnel will include . . . system programmers. [They] are obviously in the most sensitive 
position of all, for they ‘know all’ concerning the protective features built into the hardware and 
software.”). Armer goes as far as to suggest that “[c]learly, we . . . need the equivalent of bank 
examiners to insure the overall integrity of [the system].” Armer, supra note 334, at 14. 
 337. See Picker, supra note 274, at 9–11 (“[C]ontrol of users’ datastreams can implicate 
privacy and competition concerns . . . .”). 
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as Google and Facebook.338 What these and other providers can do 
with personally identifiable information has become a major area of 
concern.339 The Obama administration has begun an effort to examine 
digital privacy issues, including the formation of an interagency task 
force and reports from the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Commerce.340 Public policy activity in this area seems 
bound to increase. 
The FCC made privacy a significant element of its original 
Computer I Notice of Inquiry.341 As it noted, “Privacy, particularly in 
the area of communications, is a well established policy and objective 
of the Communications Act.”342 The Communications Act includes 
customer proprietary network information (CPNI) rules for 
 
 338. See, e.g., MARY MADDEN, SUSANNAH FOX, AARON SMITH & JESSICA VITAK, DIGITAL 
FOOTPRINTS: ONLINE IDENTITY MANAGEMENT AND SEARCH IN THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY 
2 (2007), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2007/PIP_Digital_
Footprints.pdf.pdf (noting the vast array of personal data stored online); Soghoian, supra note 
249, at 361 (listing Google and Amazon.com as cloud services that provide customers with large 
data storage capabilities); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and 
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1411 (2001) (noting Amazon.com’s 
ability to keep track of customer purchases); Konstantinos K. Stylianou, An Evolutionary Study 
of Cloud Computing Services Privacy Terms, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 593, 595 
(2010) (naming Yahoo! Mail, Google Docs, and Amazon EC2 as cloud services that “aggregate 
large amounts of data”); Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 
4 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1435 (2008) (“Google’s access to and storage of vast amounts of personal 
information create a serious privacy problem . . . .”); Maria Aspan, How Sticky Is Membership 
on Facebook? Just Try Breaking Free, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008, at C1 (noting the difficulty of 
removing private information from Facebook once it has been posted); Johann Cas, Privacy in 
Pervasive Computing Environments—A Contradiction in Terms?, IEEE TECH. & SOC’Y MAG., 
Spring 2005, at 24, 25 (noting privacy concerns in developing pervasive computing systems). 
 339. See, e.g., Michael A. Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000); 
Paul T. Jaeger, Jimmy Lin & Justin M. Grimes, Cloud Computing and Information Policy: 
Computing in a Policy Cloud?, 5 J. INFO. TECH. & POL’Y 269 (2008); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving 
to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway 
Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27 (1995); Daniel J. 
Solove, The Digital Person and the Future of Privacy, in PRIVACY AND IDENTITY: THE PROMISE 
AND PERILS OF A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 3 (Katherine Strandburg ed., 2005); Bruce R. Wells, 
The Fog of Cloud Computing: Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the Blurring of Online and 
Offline Content, 12 J. CONST. L. 223 (2009); Couillard, supra note 277; Cloudy with a Chance of 
Rain, ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 2010, at 6; Stephen H. Wildstrom, Google’s Gmail Is Great—But Not 
for Privacy, BUS. WK., May 3, 2004, at 30; Jason Kincaid, Google Privacy Blunder Shares Your 
Docs Without Permission, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 7, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/03/07/
huge-google-privacy-blunder-shares-your-docs-without-permission. 
 340. See Edward Wyatt & Tanzina Vega, F.T.C. Backs Plan to Honor Privacy of Online 
Users, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, at A1 (discussing the FTC’s report and proposal to allow users 
to opt out of behavioral tracking). 
 341. Computer I NOI, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, 15–17 (1966). 
 342. Id. at 16. 
WERBACH IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 4/14/2011  6:24:49 PM 
1836 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1761 
telecommunications carriers, which limit the carriers’ ability to use 
network management data for marketing purposes.343 The phone 
company knows who its customers are calling, but it cannot sell that 
information to a marketer or offer those customers a new product 
based on the identity of their friends. Those CPNI rules did not apply 
to unregulated data processing services. In Computer I, the FCC 
considered whether it was appropriate to impose similar obligations 
on how computer utilities handled customer data. At the same time as 
the FCC addressed data privacy in Computer I, Congress held several 
hearings on the topic.344 
In the end, the FCC declined to adopt any privacy requirements 
in Computer I.345 The FCC was concerned that such action would 
exceed its jurisdictional authority, and that it might be better 
addressed by other agencies or Congress.346 Indeed, many dimensions 
of privacy and information governance go beyond the expertise of the 
FCC. There are some privacy-related questions, however, that 
communications regulators are best situated to address. As danah 
boyd and Professor Randal Picker observe, cloud computing 
platforms bear many of the indicia of public utilities, such as 
telephone companies, that are subject to special obligations in their 
handling of user data.347 
Whether such obligations should extend to services such as 
Facebook and Google is a debatable proposition. There are good 
arguments that market forces or more targeted interventions may be 
sufficient. Drawing a bright line between telephone companies 
 
 343. 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (2006) (“Except as required by law or with the approval of the 
customer, a telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains customer proprietary network 
information by virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service shall only use, disclose, or 
permit access to individually identifiable [CPNI] in its provision of (A) the telecommunications 
service from which such information is derived, or (B) services necessary to, or used in, the 
provision of such telecommunications service, including the publishing of directories.”). 
 344. See Davison et al., supra note 220, at 309–15 (discussing congressional action to protect 
privacy in the computer field). 
 345. See Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 294–95 (1970) (noting that the 
FCC would “give further consideration” to regulatory action regarding privacy needs); 
McDonald, supra note 154, at 8 (noting that the FCC’s Computer decisions and the deregulatory 
political environment kept computers from being federally regulated). 
 346. See Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 294–95 (“The privacy issue in its 
broadest sense has numerous social and public policy implications which go well beyond the 
pale of our jurisdiction over communications . . . .”). 
 347. See Picker, supra note 274, at 9–11 (discussing the effects of privacy restrictions on the 
cable industry); boyd, Facebook Is a Utility, supra note 274 (arguing that Facebook is like a 
utility and will likely be regulated). 
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subject to stringent information privacy restrictions and other digital 
data aggregators, however, creates an artificial distinction. Some of 
those unregulated providers include cable operators competing in the 
same broadband access market as the telephone companies; others 
include platforms like Google Voice and Skype that are able to 
collect user behavior data in the same manner as telephone 
companies.348 
4. Transparency.  The final area for consideration is 
transparency. In a way, Computer I was all about transparency. The 
questions in the Notice of Inquiry largely concerned the terms and 
conditions of services that carriers provided to data processing 
providers.349 Computer I was, in effect, the FCC’s way of 
understanding marketplace conditions. The FCC did not adopt any 
formal transparency mandate because it did not have to. The 
regulated carriers were subject to tariffing requirements that 
obligated them to disclose the terms and conditions of their offerings. 
Those tariffs have gone by the wayside, however, and unregulated 
computer-based services have never had to file them. 
The FCC adopted a transparency mandate in its Open Internet 
Order.350 It added this principle, along with a nondiscrimination rule, 
to the four consumer-protection principles it had articulated in 2005. 
The Comcast-BitTorrent imbroglio demonstrated how the lack of 
transparency about broadband access networks’ practices could 
create confusion and uncertainty. Comcast imposed a network 
management system that disadvantaged peer-to-peer file sharing, but 
neither customers, nor other services providers, were aware of its 
terms.351 Comcast itself often seemed unclear about what it was doing, 
 
 348. For a comparison between VoIP and legacy voice services, see Dong Hee Shin, VoIP: 
A Debate Over Information Service or Telephone Application in US: A New Perspective in 
Convergence Era, 23 TELEMATICS & INFORMATICS 57, 59–61 (2006); and see also Daniel B. 
Garrie, Matthew J. Armstrong & Donald P. Harris, Voice Over Internet Protocol and the 
Wiretap Act: Is Your Conversation Protected?, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 105–08 (2005). 
 349. Computer I NOI, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, 7–15 (1966). 
 350. See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1, 
31–32 (Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order) (adopting a universal transparency requirement for 
mobile broadband). 
 351. The FCC was particularly harsh on Comcast’s choice to keep its network management 
practices secret from its customers. See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge 
Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 
13,028, 13,059 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order), vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 
F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[A]lthough Comcast eventually disclosed some elements of its 
network management practices to customers, Comcast’s first reaction to allegations of 
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perhaps because its engineers and lawyers were not communicating 
internally. One of the FCC’s requirements in its 2008 order 
sanctioning Comcast was that the company file a report detailing the 
practices it had engaged in.352 Comcast also had to file a description of 
the new, protocol-agnostic network-management system it had 
adopted instead.353 The company did so, even while successfully 
challenging the legal authority for the FCC’s actions.354 
Comcast’s disclosure of both its discriminatory practices and its 
replacement network management approach created a learning 
experience for the company, the FCC, and the industry. Engineers 
knew that peer-to-peer systems and other developments were 
straining broadband networks, especially the shared last-mile systems 
of cable operators. The degree of the problem and the efficacy of 
solutions, however, were difficult to gauge when companies kept 
mum about their actual experiences. The Comcast order, however, 
was a one-time requirement for a specific situation. A more universal 
transparency requirement might help prevent and resolve similar 
disputes in the future.355 
The Comcast–Level 3 dispute illustrates the perils of a 
nontransparent environment. The terms of Comcast’s business 
relationship with Level 3, as with all of its backbone peering and 
transit contracts, are private.356 Comcast’s decision to impose new 
 
discriminatory treatment was not honesty, but at best misdirection and obfuscation. If Comcast 
actually believed its practices were reasonable, it should not have behaved in this manner. A 
hallmark of whether something is reasonable is whether a provider is willing to disclose to its 
customers what it is doing. To the extent that Comcast wishes to employ capacity limits in the 
future, it should disclose those to customers in clear terms.”). 
 352. Id. at 13,059–60; see also Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President, Comcast 
Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC (Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/
ecfs/document/view?id=6520169715 (describing Comcast’s network management practices, in 
compliance with the FCC order). 
 353. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge, 23 FCC Rcd. at 13,059–60; see 
also Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President, Comcast Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, 
Sec’y, FCC 1 (Jan. 5, 2009), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=
6520192582 (reporting that Comcast had discontinued and replaced the network management 
practices for which it was censured). 
 354. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d at 644 (vacating the 2008 order). 
 355. Gerald Faulhaber & David Farber, The Open Internet: A Customer-Centric Framework, 
4 INT’L. J. COMM. 302, 315–16 (2010); Richard S. Whitt, Evolving Broadband Policy: Taking 
Adaptive Stances to Foster Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 530–31 
(2009). 
 356. For an explanation of the moral hazard that undisclosed peering agreements entail, the 
opportunistic behavior they may spur, and how information asymmetry between the principal 
and agent can be taken advantage of by the agent, see COSTAS COURCOUBETIS & RICHARD 
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usage-based charges on Level 3 would never have even entered the 
realm of policy discussion had Level 3 not gone public. Both parties 
engaged in a pattern of strategic partial disclosures to advance their 
claims. There is no neutral way to ascertain the economics and the 
typicality of the Comcast–Level 3 arrangement. 
There are sometimes business reasons to keep a negotiation 
confidential. In the case of network interconnection, however, the 
strategic value seems limited, at least in light of the benefits of 
disclosure. Large networks have often kept their backbone-peering 
terms confidential, and they have even subjected those with whom 
they are interconnected to nondisclosure agreements.357 Comcast is 
actually one of the more liberal companies on that score, posting its 
peering terms on a public website.358 
Transparency creates ancillary benefits as well. Transparency 
about standards and protocols will push toward greater portability of 
data across cloud platforms. This portability would benefit users and 
would create new opportunities for innovation. Furthermore, 
network researchers have lacked comprehensive data on Internet 
traffic flows since the NSF privatized the Internet backbone.359 If the 
FCC promotes the open dissemination of data through standard 
formats, researchers can apply this data to many other problems. 
Furthermore, the mere knowledge that business arrangements and 
internal technical practices may be made public can influence 
corporate behavior. Companies will be less likely to employ 
 
WEBER, PRICING COMMUNICATION NETWORKS: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY AND 
MODELLING 286–87 (2003); and see also Ioanna D. Constantiou & Nikolaos A. Mylonopoulos, 
Towards Sustainable Quality of Service in Interconnection Agreements: Implications from 
Information Asymmetry, ECIS 2001 PROC. 865, 866 (2001) (same). 
 357. See Kende, supra note 95, at 56 (referring to the nondisclosure agreements that cover 
contracts between backbones); Werbach, supra note 25, at 370 (noting the confidential nature of 
peering agreements). 
 358. See Press Release, Comcast Corp., supra note 98 (describing Comcast’s agreement with 
Level 3). 
 359. See KIMBERLY CLAFFY, CAIDA, TEN THINGS LAWYERS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE 
INTERNET 2 (2008), available at http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2008/lawyers_top_ten/
lawyers_top_ten.pdf (noting that the current legal framework constrains researchers’ access to 
adequate information to conduct accurate analyses); Sascha D. Meinrath & kc claffy, The 
COMMONS Initiative: Cooperative Measurement and Modeling of Open Networked Systems, 16 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 407, 411 (2008) (same); Colleen Shannon, David Moore, Ken Keys, 
Marina Fomenkov, Bradley Huffaker & k claffy, The Internet Measurement Data Catalog, ACM 
SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM. REV., Oct. 2005, at 97, 98 (2005) (“One of the most 
fundamental problems remains access to current data.”). 
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questionable network management practices if they know their 
actions will become public. 
CONCLUSION 
The task for the FCC and, ultimately, Congress, is to formulate a 
regulatory program that promotes wealth creation, innovation, and 
civic values in the novel environment of converged communications 
and computing. The choices first made in Computer I continue to 
influence public policy for network industries. Quarantining data 
services from regulation and attempting to police the dividing line is 
an increasingly treacherous proposition. Internet-based digital 
services should not be subject to the strictures of traditional common 
carrier regulation, but they do raise a series of important policy 
considerations. The FCC’s emphasis on regulatory questions relating 
to broadband access masked an evolution of the Internet toward 
more centralized platforms. The basic public policy challenge for the 
FCC will not be the choice between regulation and deregulation, or 
between closed and open networks. It will be to translate the age-old 
concept of public utilities into the contemporary environment of 
cloud computing. 
 
